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Abstract
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was signed into law on November 12, 1999.
This act is regarded as the most influential deregulation for the U.S. financial services
industry in the past one-century. The purpose of this study is to determine and analyze the
wealth effects of the GLBA on U.S. and foreign banks and insurance companies.
This dissertation is composed of four separate essays. In the first two chapters I
investigate the wealth effects of the GLBA on domestic banks and insurance companies. I
find that Money Center Banks followed by Super Regional Banks benefit most from this
deregulation. I also find that banks with Section 20 investment subsidiaries benefit more
than rest of the industry. For all types of banks exposure to systematic risk reduces
following the enactment of the GLBA. In cross sectional analysis I find that banks size
and change in exposure to systematic risk can explain the wealth effects at firm level.
In the domestic insurance industry, property/casualty and life insurance
companies have the highest wealth effect. Exposure to systematic risk also reduces for all
types of insurance companies following the enactment of the GLBA. From cross
sectional analysis I find that diversification opportunities and safeguards against
excessive risk taking create value for property/casualty and all other (except life)
insurance companies. I also test merger related hypothesis. The result shows that poor
performing firms and larger firms gain more form this deregulation.

xv

In the third and fourth chapter I investigate the wealth effects of the GLBA on
international banks and foreign insurance companies. I find that the events leading to the
passage of the GLBA have significant negative wealth effects (spill-over effects) on the
portfolios of banks and insurance companies for most of the developed countries I
analyze. These effects are not same for any two countries. Most importantly I find that
reduction in diversification opportunities for international banks and foreign insurance
companies in the U.S. market can explain the wealth effects at firm level from the GLBA.

xvi
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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the impact of the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999 (also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)) on the stockholder returns
of banking and insurance industry, domestically and internationally. It also examines the
factors that can explain the cross sectional variation of returns. On November 12, 1999,
President Clinton signed the GLBA into law. This law officially ends the Depression era
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, that prohibitis commercial banks from entering investment
banking, and ends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which prohibits commercial
banks from insurance underwriting. It allows banks, brokerage firms, and insurance
companies to merge. In addition, newly created Financial Holding Companies (FHC)
may engage in a wider range of activities, including insurance underwriting, securities
activity, merchant banking, and real estate development. Existing banks can extend
insurance and investment activity using their subsidiaries.
The GLBA is the most sweeping deregulation of the U.S. financial services
industry in the last century. To comprehend the impact, one should look at the major
change brought in by the major provisions. Since the passage of law, a total of 591 FHC
were created (as of November 30, 2001). The FHC is the centerpiece of the GLBA. Once
a financial firm obtains the FHC designation, it can house a complete family of financial
activities. The Glass-Steagall Act is said to have limited the financial institutions’ ability

2
to pursue economies of scope , while it is argued that GLBA has created opportunities for
1

domestic as well as international financial intermediaries.

1.1

History of Regulation in the US Financial Services Industry from
Glass-Steagall to Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Thousands of banks failed in the years (1930-1933) following the stock market

crash of 1929; as a result, it seems natural to make a connection between bank runs and
bank involvement in the securities business. The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted to
protect consumers and the economy from a conflict of interest of banking conglomerates
in the security business. It created a highly regimented financial industry, in which
commercial banks were limited to lending and deposit gathering. Thrifts were mortgage
lenders, investment banks served as underwriters and brokers of both stock and bonds,
and insurance firms were providers of actuarial products. Congress left the framework to
encourage the state prohibitions on branch banking. It also established the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and raised minimum capital requirements for
national banks. The Bank Holding Company Act (BHC) of 1956, on the other hand,
prohibited banking firms from non-banking activities; as such, it closed bank
involvement in the insurance business.
At the state level, the deregulation of depression era laws started in Maine when it
permitted out of state branching. At the national level, deregulation began in 1980 when
Congress allowed banks to offer competitive interest rates on deposits. The Garn-St.
Germain Act of 1982 allowed banks to enter cross state boundaries to acquire troubled
banks. In 1983, the Federal Reserve allowed Bank Holding Companies (BHC) to acquire
1

Benston 1996, and Rajan 1996
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discount security brokers. Ultimately, in 1987, the Federal Reserve allowed BHCs to
underwrite certain ‘bank ineligible’ securities through the Section 20 investment
subsidiary with a cap on the revenue from ‘ineligible’ activities to be 5%. The Federal
Reserve increased the revenue limit from ‘ineligible’ activities twice, once in 1989 (to
10%) and the last time in 1997 (to 25%). Due to the restriction on revenue, only the
largest of the banks (only 40) had a full line of investment banking. The 1994 RiegleNeale Banking and Branching Efficiency Act removed constraints on bank holding
company acquisitions across state lines, and also permitted banks to branch interstate if
permitted by state law.
Other federal authorities also allowed banks to get involved in securities services.
For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in 1996 allowed
subsidiaries of national banks to offer a wider range of securities activities under some
restrictions. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1984 ruled that nonmember banks are not subject to Glass-Steagall restrictions, and in 1987 it further
amended the previous ruling by eliminating the operational separation between banks and
their subsidiaries. The present effort of financial modernization began in 1995 when
Representative Jim Leach became the chair of the House Banking Committee. Leach
first introduced the financial services modernization bill in Congress. The last attempt to
repeal the Glass-Steagall was in 1998 when the bill was blocked on the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) provision.

1.2

GLBA and the Domestic Financial Services Industry

The centerpiece created by the GLB is the Financial Holding Company (FHC).
BHCs and foreign banks that meet certain criteria can become a FHC. All depository
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institutions must be well managed and well capitalized to become a FHC. If the FHC or
foreign bank fails to meet any such standards after they became FHC, they have 180 days
to correct it or the Federal Reserve (FED) may order the company to divest or terminate
its financial activities or depository subsidiaries. No declaration to become FHC is
effective under the GLBA unless each of its depository subsidiaries has at least a
satisfactory or better rating under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). If any of the
FHC’s depository subsidiaries falls short of a satisfactory CRA rating, the FED may ask
the company not to acquire any other company or get involved in any additional financial
activity. The act authorizes the FHCs to engage in a wider range of activity under the
extended power granted by the GLBA. These activities may be financial in nature like
securities underwriting and dealing, insurance agency and underwriting activities, and
merchant banking activities. The FED may also allow additional activities after
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury (it may be non-financial activity
complementary to financial activity as long as it does not pose substantial risk to the
depository institute). The FHC does not need prior permission from the FED to acquire a
financial company, but it has to notify the FED within 30 days of doing such.
The GLBA authorizes extended powers to banks. Well-capitalized banks can
underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds. Financial subsidiaries of a national bank
may engage in activities that are not permitted of national banks. However, a financial
subsidiary of the national bank may not engage as a principal in underwriting insurance,
providing or issuing annuities, nor is it allowed to engage in real estate development or
investment, merchant banking or complementary activities that are allowed to affiliates
of the FHC. Under the new law national banks may continue to engage in insurance
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activities from any region with a population of five thousand or less. National banks are
also required to have prior OCC permission to conduct activities through the financial
subsidiary. State member banks can own or control a subsidiary engaging in all the
activities allowed to the financial subsidiary of a national bank conditional on compliance
with the same regulations as national banks. State banks may also engage as principals in
activities not allowed to national banks conditional on the approval of the FDIC.

Umbrella Supervisor
FED

FHC

Banking
Activities

FDIC, FED & OCC
(Primary Bank
Regulators.

Securities
Activity

Securities Exchange
Commission CFTC

Insurance
Activity

State Insurance
Commissioners

Activities Supervisors

Fig 1: Supervisory Structure of FHCs under GLBA.
The FED is going to serve as the overall supervisor of the FHCs and traditional
regulators will oversee their business activities (banking, investment and insurance). The
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act contains several new regulations concerning the privacy of customer financial
information. The GLBA requires the financial institution to provide the potential
customer with their policies and practices regarding the collection and disclosure of nonpublic personal information to their affiliates and third parties. They are also required to
update the customers regarding their policy at least annually. The act prohibits the
disclosure of non-public private information to a non-affiliated third party without the
approval of the customer and allows the customer to opt out from any such agreement.
Financial institutions are generally prohibited under the law from disclosing non-public
private consumer information to third party marketing programs, including telemarketing
and direct mail programs.
Under the act, any insured depository institution with $250 million or more in
aggregate assets would be subject to a routine CRA examination. An institution will be
examined for compliance with the CRA once every 5 years if it is given an ‘outstanding’
rating in the most recent CRA examination and once every four years if it is given a
‘satisfactory’ rating. Any institution that comes under the jurisdiction of the CRA must
submit a report to the federal agency concerning the use of CRA related money and
resources during the previous year.

1.3

GLBA and Foreign Financial Institutions

Under GLBA, international banks can engage in commercial banking, merchant
banking and insurance in ways consistent with their business strategies. If the
international bank becomes a Financial Holding Company (FHC) there is no limit to the
revenue generated by its insurance activity, merchant banking activity or investment
banking activity. To qualify for the FHC it must notify the Federal Reserve about the
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activities in which it will engage and make certain required certifications to it. In order to
become a FHC, its depository institution must be well capitalized and well managed and
no insured institutions within the FHC can have less than satisfactory rating in
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).
International banks have to decide whether they should keep its current structure
and continue to engage in current activities or engage in other and newer activities now
permitted under the new regulation. If the international banks engage in the traditional
commercial banking in US via a branch or agency it may still do so without changing the
structure. But if the US branch or agency engages in certain securities, merchant banking
or investment banking activities in the US, the operation has to be ceased unless they are
grandfathered2. Under the new regulation, the activity and not the entity determines the
primary supervisory authority.
Most international banks that were engaged in significant insurance activities did
so through a domestic bank or an insurance subsidiary of a domestic bank. Now the
international banks have to operate via an existing licensed insurance subsidiary or
establish new subsidiary and obtain license from state insurance department where it
wants to sell the insurance to take full advantage of the opportunity provided by the new
regulation.
Most of the international banks carry out their investment or merchant banking
activities in US through Section 20 investment subsidiary. These banks can continue to
engage in these activities so long as they are grandfathered, but they can’t engage in new
activities. Some of the international banks in the US engage in investment banking
2

Grandfathered means the bank may continue to engage in the activity because it did so before the
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through domestic banks and trust companies. These operations have to be terminated as
the new law requires the international bank to engage in these activities through a US
registered broker dealer.
In order to engage in any activity in US, an international bank has to be well
capitalized and well managed by the standards set by FED. The Federal Reserve will
review the worldwide operation of international banks to determine whether they can
engage in commercial banking or any other activities in the US at all.

1.4
1.4.1

Literature Review

Literature on the impact of GLBA on domestic Financial Institutions
Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) investigate the market response of the

GLBA on the three major industries. While they did not find any market response for the
commercial banks, they did however find a significantly positive wealth effect for the
insurance and the brokerage industries only on one event. They argue that loopholes in
the laws have long allowed banks to have a “fairly substantial presence in other sectors”
as a reason to why there is no wealth effect for the commercial banks. For all 3 industries
they find that not only does firm size matter but also that for commercial banks
profitability can explain the cross-sectional variation in return. Similarly, Carow and
Heron (2002) find that while brokerage firms and insurance companies benefit from the
GLBA, banks do not. They also find negative returns for foreign banks, thrifts, and
finance companies; larger non-depository firms have higher returns. Akhigbe and Whyte
(2001), on the other hand, find that all three industries benefit from the provisions of
GLBA and that larger and well-capitalized banks benefit more from this law. Brokerage

restrictions became law. New activities are not covered by the grandfather provision.
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firms benefit regardless of size, but the gains are inversely related to capital position.
Insurance companies benefit regardless of size and capitalization. Barth, Brumbaugh, and
Wilcox (2000) argue that GLBA is just ratifying the "Status Quo” rather than being
revolutionary, and that this law goes more in favor of the big banks and big financial
institutions.
1.4.2

Literature on studies investigating major deregulations before GLBA
There are several studies that look at the major deregulations leading up to the

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Cornett, Ors and Tehranian (2002) examine the performance
of commercial banks around the establishment of a Section 20 subsidiary. They find that
Section 20 activities undertaken by commercial banks result in increased industryadjusted operating cash flow return on assets, due mainly to revenues from noncommercial banking activities. The initial alliances of commercial banks and investment
banks via the establishment of Section 20 subsidiaries have been beneficial to
commercial bank performance and allowed commercial banks to diversify their activities
with increased performance relative to the risk being undertaken. Cyree (2000) also finds
similar results for increased investment banking powers for commercial banks, when the
revenue limit for investment subsidiaries increased from 10% to 25%. He also finds that
the larger banks benefit more than smaller banks. Ely and Robinson (1998) analyze the
wealth effect on banking and security firms in the event of an increase in the revenue
limit on bank security subsidiaries from 10% to 25%. They tried to predict the impact of
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act would have on these two industries. They find that
the expansion has a positive wealth effect around the announcement for most of the
individual investment banks. This study also finds that this expansion has a positive

10
wealth effect for the banks, especially for the firms that already have a security
subsidiary. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) investigate the effect of bank holding
company (BHC) mergers with non-bank financial firms using simulated data and find
that BHC mergers with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduced risk.
Irrespective of using market or accounting data they reach the same conclusion. Gande,
Puri, and Saunders (1999) examine the competitive effects of commercial bank entry into
the corporate debt underwriting market. They find that the underwriting spread and exante yields have declined significantly with bank entry. The effect is strongest among the
low-rated smaller debt issues of which banks have underwritten a relatively greater share.
They show that bank entry decreased market concentrations. Puri (1996) examines the
question: ‘When commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities,
does this hamper or enhances their role as certifiers of firm value?’ She finds that
investors are willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than
investment houses.
1.4.3

Literature on Size, Profitability and Diversification Benefits
Size is important for exploiting merger opportunities. For example, Hawawini,

and Swary (1990) find that acquirers are significantly larger than targets. Calem (1994)
finds that after bank holding company branching reforms, large banks acquired small
banks. In addition, Cheng, Gup, and Wall (1989), and Palia (1993) find that larger
acquiring firms add more to target bank value.
There is evidence that poorly performing firms become potential targets for
mergers. BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) find that timely mergers in the insurance industry
serve as an alternative to insolvency in 20% to 46% of the mergers considered in their
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study. Similarly Whiting (1997) argues that banking organizations with higher ROEs
(Return on Equity) or ROAs (Return on Asset) are more likely to purchase insurers that
have lower ROE or ROA. Swary (1986) shows that target banks with higher capital ratios
than their bidder banks have greater abnormal returns. Thus, it seems that abolishing
cross-industry merger barriers will create wealth effects for poorly performing firms.
The GLBA may create diversification benefits for the financial services industry
by removing merger barriers. Wall, Reichert and Mohanty (1993) investigate whether
combinations of bank and non-bank firms can reduce a banking organizations’ operating
risk. They conclude that the best opportunity for diversification gains is for banks to
merge with firms engaged in some aspects of the insurance industry. Boyd, Graham and
Hewitt (1993), using simulated data, find that bank holding company (BHC) mergers
with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduce risk.
1.4.4

Literature on international spillover effects
There is evidence in the literature of international spill over effects that predict

that the impact of GLBA will not be limited to the U.S. financial services industry.
Bruner and Simms (1987) examine the reaction of the U.S. banks to the Mexico’s loan
crisis find that the U.S. banks reacts negatively to the news. Musumerci and Sinkey
(1990) find that Brazil’s announcement of a debt moratorium in 1987 had negative
impact on the U.S. money center banks. Madura, Whyte and McDaniel (1991) find that
Citicorp’s announcement of significant increase in loan-loss reserve in 1987 had a
significant negative impact on British banks. In all of the above cases the exposure of
banks to the less developed countries are identified as the reason for the negative
reactions.
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1.4.5

Cross boarder consolidation and risk expected return tradeoffs
The available empirical research suggests that at least some types of cross-

boarder consolidation can improve the risk-expected return tradeoffs. The literature on
commercial banks in the U.S. generally find that larger, more geographically diversified
institutions tend to have better risk expected return tradeoffs (e.g. Macllister and
McManus (1993), Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 1999), Hughes and Mester
(1998) and Demsetz and Strahan (1997)), while Cummins and Weiss (2000) find that
international diversification can improve risk expected return tradeoff and profit
efficiency for insurance industry.
1.4.6

Literature on the determinants of foreign bank presence, activity and growth
Grosse and Goldberg (1991) investigate the foreign banking activity in the United

States by their country of origin. Their results show that foreign investment (FDI and
foreign portfolio investment) into United States, bilateral trade, size of each country’s
banking sector (demand deposit and Time deposit) are positively correlated with that
country’s bank presence in the U.S. Hultman and McGee (1989) find that foreign
presence of US bank subsidiaries are directly related to FDI, exchange rate, and inversely
related to P/E ratios. They find that the growth of foreign bank branches and agencies in
the U.S. is directly related to FDI, exchange rate and the passage of International
Banking Act (IBA) of 1978. Goldberg and Saunders (1981) show that important
determinants in foreign banks’ growth in the US are size of interest differentials between
U.S. and foreign deposits and loan, the falling P/E ratio for US bank stocks, increased
size of FDI, the persistent depreciation in the dollar and the expectation that the IBA of
1978 would have a restrictive affect on foreign bank activity in the US. Seth et al. (1998)
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show that one of the major determinants of financial institutions growth abroad has been
the parallel growth of foreign direct investment and foreign trade by globally oriented
multinational corporations from the institution’s home country.

1.5

Methodology

In this paper we use both market return and balance sheet information of banks to
test the above hypotheses. The stock price reaction of regulatory changes is estimated
using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model of Zellner (1962). A similar method is
used in other studies3.
We use an extension of the standard market model. Lag values of the market
index are used in our model to address the possible nonsynchronous trading effect. We
use dummy variables to identify the major events that led to the passage of the GLBA.
The dummy variable is equal to 1 over the event window and zero otherwise. The
coefficient estimate associated with the dummy variable measures the impact of the event
on the portfolio return. We employ the three factors model used in the banking literature4.
Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of firms in the same industry
measured over a common time period are contemporaneously correlated because the
firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So, in events such as regulatory
changes, the residuals will not be ‘iid’ (identically and independently distributed). If
there is a contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances across equations but not
correlated over time, the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) model estimates will be

3

Schipper and Thompson (1983), Binder (1985a,b, and 1988), Rose (1985), Smith, Bradley and Jarrell
(1986), Cornett and Tehranian (1989,1990), Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins (2000).
4
Wetmore and Brick (1994) and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992)
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more efficient then the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimates. Thus, we use SUR to
estimate the following models.
1.5.1

Overall Impact of The Regulation
We estimate the following model in order to test for the winners and losers in the

banking industry:
Rit = α i + α i′D + β i1 Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt + β i 4 Rmt −2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D
+ β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rft + κ i Rrt + γ i DGt + eit

(1)

Here, Rit = return on portfolio i (=1,2,3) on day t (T=daily observations from
January 1998 to December 2000). Rmt = Return on CRSP value weighted index at time t.
αi = the intercept coefficient for portfolio i. βi1-βi3 = market risk coefficient for portfolio i.
βi4-βi6 = measures the change in the exposure to systematic risk. δi = foreign exchange
risk coefficient for portfolio i. κi = the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. Dt =
dummy variable which is equal to 1 in every event window and zero otherwise. eit = the
random disturbances. D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the enactment of the
regulation (after 11/21/99). DG is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 over every event
window and zero otherwise. γi captures the average impact of the regulation on portfolio
i.
1.5.2

Impact of Individual Events on Portfolios
In order to test for hypotheses surrounding the events we estimate the following

model:
Rit = α i + α i′D + β i1 Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt + β i 4 Rmt −2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D
K

+ β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rft + κ i Rrt + ∑ γ ik Dkt + eit
k =1

(2)
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Here, Dkt is the dummy variable which is equal to one on event window k and
zero otherwise, so γik captures the average impact of kth announcement on portfolio i.
Following Green (1997), the above model in matrix form can be written as:
 R1   X
  
 R1   0
...  =  ...
  
...   ...
R   0
 m  

0
X
...
...
0

...
...
...
...
...

...
...
...
...
...

e1 
0

e 
0
 2

...  β + ... 

 
... 
... 
em 
X 

(3)

Here each element of matrix or vector has T observations and X are the
regressors i.e. α, αD, Rmt-2, Rmt-1, Rmt, Rmt-2*D, Rmt-1*D, Rmt*D, Rft, Rrt, Dkt. Let

ε = [ e1′ e2′ ... ... em′ ]

(4)

The assumption regarding the error term is:
E[ε] =0
E[εε’] =0
E[eitejs’] =σij; if t=s and 0 otherwise.
The disturbance formulation is therefore,
E[etej’] =σijIT
 σ 11 IT
σ I
 21 T
E [εε ′] = V =  ...

 ...
σ m1 IT
Now Let,

σ 12 IT
σ 22 IT
...
...
σ m 2 IT

...
...
...
...
...

...
...
...
...

σ 1m IT 
σ 2 m IT 
... 

... 
σ mm IT 

(5)
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 σ 11 σ 12
σ
 21 σ 22
Σ =  ...
...

...
 ...
σ m1 σ m 2

...
...
...
...
...

... σ 1m 
... σ 2 m 
... ... 

... ... 
... σ mm 

(6)

Substituting Σ in equation 5 we get,
V = Σ⊗I
V −1 = Σ −1 ⊗ I

(7)

So the GLS (Generalized Least Squares) estimator of SUR is,

βˆ = [ X ′V −1 X ]−1 X ′V −1 R = [ X ′(Σ −1 ⊗ I ) X ]−1 X ′(Σ −1 ⊗ I ) R
1.5.3

(8)

Specification test
We present a simple specification test to verify our extended model. Specification

tests in this case involve testing for correlation across portfolios; this is the same as
testing the hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of S (variance-covariance matrix)
are zero. There are two such specification tests in the literature: the Likelihood Ratio
(LR) test and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The statistics in both cases are χ2
distributed. Berndt and Savin (1977) demonstrate that the following inequality holds:
LM ≤ LR
between these statistics. Since we have the same asymptotic distribution, the LM
test rejects the null hypothesis less often than the LR test. We will use the LR test to
check for the diagonality of the variance-covariance matrix. Excluding the diagonal
elements, there are 1/2m∗(m-1) unknown parameters in S and these can be arranged in
vector θ. The null hypothesis that we will test is:
H:θ = 0
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This test is based on the following statistics
m

λ LR = T [ ∑ log σˆ i2 − log | ∑ˆ |]
i −1

(9)

2
ˆ is the
where σ̂ i is ei′ei / T from the individual least squares regressions and ∑

maximum likelihood estimator S. This statistic has a limiting χ2 distribution with
1/2m∗(m-1) degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis.

1.6
1.6.1

Data Preparation and Event Selection

Firm Selection
For the first two chapters I use the SIC classification from COMPUSTAT

(Research Insight) to identify the commercial banks (SIC 6021 and 6022) and insurance
companies (Life insurance. (SIC 6311), Property/Casualty insurance (SIC 6331), Other
types of insurance (SIC 6321, 6351 6361) to create our portfolios. The return information
for this study comes from the CRSP tape, while the balance sheet information comes
from COMPUSTAT. We require these firms to have no missing trading data for at least 3
years, over the period January 1998 to December 2000. In order to match firms from
COMPUSTAT and CRSP we omitted all firms with exchange codes 4 to 10, since CRSP
only has return information of firms traded either on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.
We required the firms to have balance sheet information from 1997 to 1999. We use
return information of the sample firms from January 1998 to December 2000 to estimate
each of our models.
For the third paper I use daily common stock return data over a period from
January 1998 to December 2000. Daily stock return and the balance sheet information for
large banks from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain,
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Switzerland, and the UK are obtained from DataStream database and BankScope
database. The total sample consists of 215 international banks and 45 large U.S. banks
(over 10 billion dollar total asset in 1998). Return information for the U.S. companies are
obtained form CRSP database.
For the fourth paper I use daily common stock return data over a period from
January 1998 to December 2000. Daily stock return and balance sheet information for
major insurance companies from Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK are obtained from Datastream database. The
total sample consists of 83 foreign insurance companies and 31 major U.S. insurance
firms. Return information for the U.S. companies are obtained form CRSP database.
1.6.2

Macro Financial Variables
Data for the two macro-economic variables used in our study is obtained from the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System5. For foreign exchange we used the
Major Country Index6 from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The
return is calculated using the following formula7:
Rf t =

5

Ft − Ft −1
Ft −1

(10)

All the information is available online from http://www.federalreserve.gov

6

The major currencies index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar
against a subset of currencies in the broad index that circulate widely outside the country of issue. The
weights are derived from those in the broad index.

7

Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994).
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Here, Ft is the value of the Major Country Index at time t. To be consistent with
the literature,8 we use the one-year T-bill rate as a proxy for the interest rate. Interest rate
returns are computed using the following formula9:
Rrt =

Rt − Rt −1
Rt −1

(11)

Here, Rt is the interest rate on one year t-bill at time t. Actual returns are used
because there is no difference in the results regardless of whether interest rates are
anticipated10; also, we do not orthogonalize the indices11.
1.6.3

Selected Events and Expected Industry Reaction to the Events
We analyze all the major events in the passage of GLBA. We include in our

analysis events that have “material change” as defined by Schipper and Thompson
(1983). In total there are 13 different events that we investigate between November 1998
and November 1999. We identify these events from the Wall Street Journal and LexisNexis wire service. Table 1 specifies these events and event dates.
The first event is news of Senator Alfonse D’Amoto’s loss of his New York reelection on November 3, 1998 and the news of Senator Gramm’s succession to Senate
Banking Committee chair on November 4, 1998. This event is important for the banking
industry because Senator Gramm favored the banking industry throughout the 1998
session, when the bill was discussed in the Senate. It is clear that if he becomes the chair

8

Kane and Unal (1998), Flannery and James (1984), and Wetmore and Brick (1994).
Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994).
10
Flannery and James (1984).
11
Giliberto (1985) argues that orthogonalizing the indices results in biased estimators. Moreover not
apparent which index is the driving index and which is the driven one., Kane and Unal (1998) argue that it
is
9

20
of the Senate Banking Committee any proposed act is likely to go more in favor of the
banking industry.
Table 1: Time line of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The
second column 'Event' describes the main event.

Date

Event

11/4/98

1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato lost his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator
Gramm to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98).

1/8/99

2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress.

2/17/99

3. Draft bill was unveiled in the Senate.

4/12/99

4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill.

4/28/99

5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the
Senate.

5/4/99

6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill.

05/06/99 –
Midnight

7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed.

7/1/99

8. House version of the bill was passed.

10/15/99

9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation.

10/22/99

10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA.

11/02/99

11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way
for the votes in both the House and the Senate.

11/4/99

12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57).

11/12/99

13. President Clinton signs the bill into law.

As a result we expect the banking industry to have a positive price reaction to this
news. The Financial Services Reform Bill is introduced in congress on January 8, 1999;
this is our second event. A similar bill has been blocked in the Senate over the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) issue; we expect a moderate reaction to this event.
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The third event on our list is the unveiling of the draft bill in the Senate on February 17,
1999. At this time the FED and Treasury are divided between who should have ultimate
control over the banking industry (OCC or FED) and what should be the structure under
which banks should diversify; i.e., should it be a Bank Holding Company (BHC)
structure or should the banks diversify using subsidiaries. After three days of hearings,
most of the legislators are in favor of giving overall control to the FED and BHC
structure (this became known as the FED’s view of modernization). This structure is
more in favor of the banking industry because they have already been successful in the
BHC structure, so we expect a positive reaction for the banking industry. The insurance
industry may have a positive reaction to this announcement because it opens the
opportunity for bank-insurance mergers that would not have been available if the other
structure of bank operation diversification were accepted. The fourth major event is the
news of Senator Gramm’s meeting with the Senate minority leader on April 4, 1999.
Senator Gramm and Senator Sarbanes (a ranking member of Senate Banking Committee)
have a difference in opinion over the CRA issue. This event may have a positive impact
on banking industry. On April 28, 1999, the Senate Banking Committee formally files the
Financial Services Modernization Act in the Senate. We expect moderate reaction for
banking industry on this event, because this version of the bill favors banks. On May 4,
1999, President Clinton suggests that the privacy protection provision for consumers
should be included in the bill. The basic principal of his proposal is that people should
have the right to decide whether information about them, held by banks, insurance firms
or securities companies, should be shared or sold. We expect this event to have a
negative impact on all the sectors because; if this provision is included into the bill, then
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it will restrict the scope economies for all sectors. The seventh event is the Senate passing
the S. 900 (Senate version of the bill) on May 6, 1999. This version includes the privacy
provision. This bill has been discussed in the Senate for a long time, so there are no
surprises in this bill; we expect moderate or no reaction on this event. The next major
event (eighth event) is the passing of the House version of the bill on July 1, 1999. This
bill may create negative reactions because the consumer privacy protection provision
included in this bill is even stronger than that of the Senate version of the bill. The FED
and Treasury agree upon the structure of regulation on October 15, 1999. Since the
negotiations between them have been going on for some time before this announcement,
we expect moderate or no reaction to this announcement. On October 22, 1999, Senate
Banking Committee Chair Senator Gramm agrees with the White House, that one version
of the CRA that will be included in the bill. The version of CRA provision that is
included in the bill is more relaxed than the 1977 version of the bill; now banks will be
subject to CRA scrutiny once every four years instead of 18 months to three years. So we
expect positive moderate or no reaction on the part of banks. But we expect a
significantly positive reaction from insurance and securities firms because this
announcement removes major obstacles to the passage of the Financial Services
Modernization Act. A Joint House conference report signed by the majority of the
members on November 2, 1999 is our eleventh event. We expect moderate or no reaction
on this event across the industry. On November 4, 1999, the Senate and the House passed
the Financial Services Modernization bill. All the provisions that go into this bill are
already known so it may not have any reaction. The final event that we analyze is the
occasion of the President’s signature of the bill on November 12, 1999. We expect major
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gains in stock price for the whole industry on this event, mainly because this law has
been in limbo for a long time;12 finally passing of this overdue bill is great news for the
whole industry.

1.7
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Chapter II
The Wealth and Risk Effects of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA) on the U.S. Banking Industry
2.1

Abstract

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 marks the end of Depression era
regulations like the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
These acts have restricted banks from securities and insurance underwriting business.
This paper examines the impact of the GLBA on the banking industry. We find that the
banking industry has a welfare gain from this law. We investigate two different
categorizations of the banking industry. We find that Money Center banks followed by
the Super Regional banks benefited most from this deregulation. On the other hand,
banks that had Section 20 investments subsidiaries gained more than other banks in the
second category. The results also show that the exposure to systematic risk for different
categories of banks decreased after the passage of this law, which implies that the GLBA
is fairly successful in containing the risk that accompanied the act and also created
diversification opportunities. For Money Center banks, Super Regional Banks, banks
with a section 20 subsidiary and banks with a new financial subsidiary, a shift in the
exposure to systematic risk can explain the overall cross sectional variation in return
from the deregulation. In both categorizations we find that larger banks gained more,
while

the

overall

explanatory

power

of

profitability

is

not

conclusive.
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2.2

Introduction

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 (also known as Financial Services
Modernization Act) starts a new era for the financial services industry in the U.S.A. This
law marks the end of depression era laws: Glass-Steagall (1933) and Bank Holding
Company Act (1956). The Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial banks and
investment banks. The Bank Holding Company Act separated commercial banks from
insurance underwriting. The modernization of the US financial services industry began in
1983 when the Federal Reserve allowed Bank Holding Companies (BHC) to acquire
discount security brokers. The GLBA is the final piece of legislation that repealed
depression era laws and allows one line of business to enter or merge with another line of
business.
What will be the impact of the law on the banking industry? Some argue that the
impact will be phenomenal1; others argue it will only be marginal2. However, if there is
any change in expected economic profit it should immediately be reflected in the stock
price of firms in that industry3. Our focus in this study is the impact of the GLBA on the
Banking Industry. Hogan (2001) argues that this law is “in its essence banking industry
legislation.” Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) find that the announcements that lead to the
passage of the GLBA create positive wealth effects for the banking industry. Herdershott,
Lee and Tompkins (2000), on the other hand, find no significant impact on the banking
industry. Both, however, find that larger banks gain more than smaller ones.

1
2
3

John D. Hogan, 2001.
Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox, 2000.
Fama and MacBeth (1973).
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The GLBA allows banks, brokerage and the insurance companies to merge. In
addition, newly created Financial Holding Companies (FHC) may engage in a wide range
of activities, including insurance underwriting, securities activity, merchant banking, and
real state development. Banks can extend insurance and securities activity using a new
type of subsidiary known as a Financial Subsidiary (FS). We examine the impact of this
landmark legislation on the banking industry. Specifically we evaluate empirically: a.
how the market values of the banking industry change at the time of various
announcements during the passage of the GLBA; b. whether the bank’s expertise and
prior access to securities activities through Section 20 subsidiaries give this industry an
edge in competition in a more integrated financial services industry; c. how the risk
behavior of the banking industry change in response to the passage of the GLBA; d. what
important characteristics of the banking industry cause increases in their market values
resulting from the passage of the GLBA; e. whether the “too big to fail” doctrine applies
to the banking industry due to the passage of the GLBA.
Several studies have investigated the GLBA. Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox
(2000) investigate the major provisions of the act. They argue that the act is ratifying the
"Status-Quo”4 rather than being revolutionary, and that this act favors big banks (‘broad
banking companies’). Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) examine the events leading up to and
the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act on the stock returns of banks,
brokerage firms, and insurance companies. They find that the impact is positive for all
institutions. Bank gains are positively related to size and capitalization. Brokerage firms
and insurance companies gain regardless of their size. Insurance firms gain regardless of

4

They said, "ratifying and extending changes that had already being made, rather than as revolutionary".
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their capital position, but brokerage firms’ gains are inversely related to their capital
position. Carow and Heron (2002), on the other hand, find that investment and insurance
companies benefit from the GLBA and that banks do not benefit. They also find negative
returns for foreign banks, thrifts and finance companies. Larger non-depository firms
have higher returns from this law.
There are several studies that look at the major deregulations leading up to the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Cornett, Ors and Tehranian (2002) examine the performance
of commercial banks around the establishment of a Section 20 subsidiary. They find that
Section 20 activities undertaken by commercial banks result in increased industryadjusted operating cash flow return on assets, due mainly to revenues from noncommercial banking activities. The initial alliances of commercial banks and investment
banks via the establishment of Section 20 subsidiaries have been beneficial to
commercial bank performance, and allowed commercial banks to diversify their activities
with increased performance relative to the risk being undertaken. Cyree (2000) also finds
similar results for increased investment banking powers for commercial banks, when the
revenue limit for investment subsidiaries increased from 10% to 25%. He also finds that
the larger banks benefit more than smaller banks. Ely and Robinson (1998) analyze the
wealth effect on banking and security firms in the event of an increase in the revenue
limit on bank security subsidiaries from 10% to 25%. They tried to predict the impact the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act would have on these two industries. They find that the
expansion has a positive wealth effect around the announcement for most of the
individual investment banks. This study also finds that this expansion has a positive
wealth effect for the banks, especially for the firms that already have a security
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subsidiary. Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993) investigate the effect of bank holding
company (BHC) mergers with non-bank financial firms using simulated data and find
that BHC mergers with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduced risk.
Irrespective of using market or accounting data they reach the same conclusion. Gande,
Puri and Saunders (1999) examine the competitive effects of commercial bank entry into
the corporate debt underwriting market. They find that the underwriting spread and exante yields have declined significantly with bank entry. The effect is strongest among the
low-rated smaller debt issues of which banks have underwritten a relatively greater share.
They show that bank entry decreased market concentrations. Puri (1996) examines the
question of when commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities,
does this hamper or enhance their role as certifiers of firm value? She finds that investors
are willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than
investment houses.
Our study improves upon previous studies in a number of ways.

First, we

examine the banking industry thoroughly as the GLBA is expected to impact the banking
industry the most. Officially, the GLBA rule-making powers are split between the
Federal Reserve (FED) and the Treasury, but the FED, the Treasury, and the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) share general oversight duties. The tug of wars among the three
regulatory authorities and the banking lobby has injected uncertainty into the financial
services industry, the resolution of which may depend on protracted negotiations between
regulators and Congress. The banking lobby, for example, frustrated by the conservative
regulatory rulings, has tried to persuade Congress to reconsider the GLBA and enforce a
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more liberal interpretation.5 We expect BHCs with Section 20 subsidiaries to experience
increases in market value mainly due to the dominance of first-mover advantage effects,
“too big to fail” guarantee effects, and possibly positive acquirer effects similar to those
documented by Kane (2000). Indeed, Kane (2000) shows that giant U.S. banking
organizations gain value from becoming larger. Our results show that banks with prior
Section 20 subsidiaries that converted into a FHC benefited the most from the GLBA.
Therefore, the banking industry in a way has internalized the potential uncertainty
created by the regulatory dialectic by adjusting their organizational structure.
Second, the GLBA is expected to benefit the financial services industry by
promoting financial innovations, lowering capital costs and increasing international
competitiveness. The real question is whether defacto deregulation has made the GlassSteagall Act effectively redundant or not. Those who argue that there will be no impact
from the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act state that, prior to enactment of the GLBA, the
financial services industry had discovered many ways to circumvent their barriers, and
the impact of which has already been impounded in the stock prices. In addition, they
argue that the anticipation of the GLBA may have initiated many developments, such as
the merger between Citicorp and Travelers in April 1998, possibly signaling that
regulators would allow similar types of mergers in the future. However, we argue that
events leading to the passage of the GLBA should have significant impact on the banking
industry. The GLBA provides more flexibility for cross-industry mergers than existed
prior to its passage. Moreover, the twenty years battle of enacting this legislation hung in

5

Schmitt (2001); Gensler (2000); Meyer (2000); Leach (2000).
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the balance until the very end, and its passage removed uncertainty regarding the
regulatory framework that will govern the future evolution of the financial industry.
Third, it has been argued that positive wealth effects accrue to banks that are
believed to be “too big to fail”. The GLBA allows large banks to expand further to
enhance their “too big too fail” guarantee. In order to examine differential impacts on
different segments of the banking industry, we divide our sample into Money Center
Banks, Super Regional Banks, and other banks. We also investigate firm specific
characteristics to test whether bigger banks gain more on various events leading to the
passage of the GLBA.
Finally, consolidation that is expected to result from the repeal of the GlassSteagall Act may reduce the number of firms in the financial services industry, but at the
same time, might create more competition for insurance and securities firms and threaten
their future profitability. The regulatory concern is to what extent the GLBA might
increase the risk of the U.S. financial industry. We argue that the banking industry
reduces their risk by diversifying their activities in the securities and insurance business.
We find that the passage of the GLBA reduces the systematic risk of the banking
industry. This result is important for the regulator’s policy making and shareholders’
investment decisions.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: the first section provides historical
overview, describes the relevant parts of the law that might affect the banking industry in
brief. Section two describes the major deregulations that came before the GLBA, the
GLBA and introduces the major hypotheses. Section three describes the methodology;
section four describes the data and lists the major events. Section five presents the
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empirical results. Section six describes the cross-sectional analysis and the final section
concludes.

2.3
2.3.1

Law and Hypotheses

The Law6
The centerpiece created by the GLB is the Financial Holding Company (FHC).

BHCs and foreign banks that meet certain criteria can become a FHC. All depository
institutions must be well managed and well capitalized to become a FHC. If the FHC or
foreign bank fails to meet any such standards after they became FHC, they have 180 days
to correct it or the Federal Reserve (FED) may order the company to divest or terminate
its financial activities or depository subsidiaries. No declaration to become FHC is
effective under the GLBA unless each of its depository subsidiaries has at least a
satisfactory or better rating under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). If any of the
FHC’s depository subsidiaries falls short of a satisfactory CRA rating, the FED may ask
the company not to acquire any other company or get involved in any additional financial
activity. The act authorizes the FHCs to engage in a wider range of activity under the
extended power granted by the GLBA. These activities may be financial in nature like
securities underwriting and dealing, insurance agency and underwriting activities, and
merchant banking activities. The FED may also allow additional activities after
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury (it may be non-financial activity
complementary to financial activity as long as it does not pose substantial risk to the
depository institute). The FHC does not need prior permission from the FED to acquire a
financial company, but it has to notify the FED within 30 days of doing such.
6

Most of the information comes from ‘Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley’ from the Federal Reserve
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The GLBA authorizes extended powers to banks. Well-capitalized banks can
underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds. Financial subsidiaries of a national bank
may engage in activities that are not permitted of national banks. However, a financial
subsidiary of the national bank may not engage as a principal in underwriting insurance,
providing or issuing annuities, engaging in real estate development or investment,
merchant banking or complementary activities that are allowed to affiliates of the FHC.
Under the new law, national banks may continue to engage in insurance activities from a
place with a population of five thousand or less. National banks are also required to have
prior OCC permission to conduct activities through the financial subsidiary. State
member banks can own or control a subsidiary engaging in all the activities allowed to
the financial subsidiary of a national bank conditional on compliance with the same
regulations as national banks. State banks may also engage as principals in activities not
allowed to national banks conditional on the approval of the FDIC.
The FED is going to serve as the overall supervisor of the FHCs and traditional
regulators will oversee their business activities (banking, investment and insurance). The
act contains several new regulations concerning the privacy of customer financial
information. The GLBA requires the financial institution to provide the potential
customer with their policies and practices regarding the collection and disclosure of nonpublic personal information to their affiliates and third parties. They are also required to
update the customers regarding their policy at least annually. The act prohibits the
disclosure of non-public private information to a non-affiliated third party without the
approval of the customer and affords the customer the option to opt out from any such

Banks of San Francisco.
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agreement. Financial institutions are generally prohibited under the law from disclosing
non-public private consumer information to third party marketing programs, including
telemarketing and direct mail programs.
Under the act, any insured depository institution with $250 million or more in
aggregate assets would be subject to a routine CRA examination. An institution will be
examined for compliance with the CRA once every 5 years if it is given an ‘outstanding’
rating in the most recent CRA examination and once every four years if it is given a
‘satisfactory’ rating. Any institution that comes under the jurisdiction of the CRA must
submit a report to the federal agency concerning the use of CRA related money and
resources during the previous year.
2.3.2

Hypotheses
We formulate the following hypotheses regarding the impact of the GLBA on the

Banking industry.
Hypothesis 1: The Banking industry benefits from the GLBA.
It is argued that regulations destroy value while deregulation creates value.
Benston (1996) and Rajan (1996) have shown that the Glass-Steagall Act had limited
financial institutions’ ability to pursue economies of scope, thereby destroying value. For
banks, scope economies are the most likely source of profitability. For example, a bank
can reuse information for which it has already paid a certain fixed cost across a range of
financial services where the bank decides to extend their business. Banks can also use
their existing technology, personnel and delivery channels to distribute securities and
insurance products with their traditional activities at relatively low marginal cost. A part
of these economies may come from overhead in administration, back office information
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and information technologies over a wider base of financial services. On the other hand,
Saunders and Smirlock (1987) note that bank customers provide a natural customer base
for brokerage firms. Synergies may also arise, as many consumers may prefer to obtain
all their financial services needs from a single firm rather than from several different
firms, as Herring and Santomero (1990) argue. Studies7 have found that deregulations
that allowed product line diversification contributed toward increased revenue and
overall risk adjusted performance enhancement for banks. So, the GLBA opens window
of opportunity for banks and should thereby benefit the industry.
Hypothesis 2: Money Center Banks and Super Regional Banks gain more from
the GLBA.
Deregulation will certainly put banks into situations where they will have cheaper
diversification opportunities. A broad banking firm may have lower profit variances
compared to a bank with traditional banking operations. Broad banking firms like Money
Center Banks and Super Regional Banks will be affected less when firms bypass banks
and raise capital directly from the capital market, because any decline in lending activity
will be offset by securities activity. Cyree (2000) shows that large banks are more
benefited than smaller banks to deregulations that eased bank involvement in the
securities business. Puri (1996), in addition, finds that investors are willing to pay higher
prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. Thus, banks
certainly have an edge in the securities business and big banks are the best positioned to
harness the benefit.

7

Cornett, Ors and Tehranian (2002), Cyree (2000).
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On the other hand, 50% to 65% (depending on the method of calculation) of all
banking organizations in the U.S.A. sell insurance products of one kind or another8.
Money Center Banks and Super Regional Banks now have the opportunity to enter the
insurance underwriting business more aggressively than before, as the GLBA will allow
banks to merge with or acquire insurance businesses. Only with these banks we expect to
see a full line of insurance operations. Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) similarly argue that
“….benefits are more likely to accrue to large, Money Center Banks that are better
positioned to capitalize on the new opportunities.”
Hypothesis 3: Banks that had Section 20 subsidiaries benefit more than banks
that did not have such subsidiaries.
Puri (1996) argues that people are willing to pay a premium for corporate debts
underwritten by banks over those underwritten by the investment houses. Under the
GLBA the revenue limit for the investment subsidiary of the banking firms increases
from the pre-act 25% to 45% of the consolidated entity. The financial subsidiaries of the
national banks can get involved in activities that are ‘financial in nature or incidental to
financial activity’, but they are prohibited from insurance underwriting and annuity
issuance. Under section 92 of the National Banking Act, national banks are permitted to
conduct insurance agency activities in offices of national banks located in a place of less
than five thousand people. Since the subsidiary of the national banks are not subject to
this geographical constraint, we expect that national banks transfer their insurance
agency activity to their financial subsidiary.

8

LaRocco, Larry, 1999.
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The revenue limit increase would certainly mean an increased income opportunity
for banks and a way of stabilizing the variance of the revenue. Banks that already had
experience of how to go about non-traditional banking activity will be more benefited
from this law. Thus, we expect that banks that had Section 20 subsidiaries will gain more.
Hypothesis 4: The GLBA reduces exposure to systematic risk across the banking
industry.
The GLBA may create diversification benefits for the financial services industry
by removing merger barriers. Wall, Reichert and Mohanty (1993) investigate whether
combinations of bank and non-bank firms can reduce a bank’s operating risk and
conclude that the best opportunity for diversification gains is for bank to merge with
firms engaged in some aspects of the insurance industry. Boyd, Graham and Hewitt
(1993), using simulated data, find bank holding company (BHC) mergers with life and
property/causality insurance companies reduce risk (systematic).
The GLBA also reduces risk by providing safeguards against excessive risk
taking. Under the GLBA certain activities are forbidden, while other activities are
restricted to the subsidiaries.

The GLBA establishes financial health criteria for

expanding business into other sectors, assigns the FED the responsibilities of FHC
supervision and regulation and gives the FED access to risk data across the entire
organization.9 The GLBA has provisions to use market signals to discipline institutions.
The GLBA also emphasized on market based measures to contain excessive risk taking
behavior. For example it assigns the FED studies of the feasibility and appropriateness of
requiring large banks to issue subordinated debt that will be rated by major rating agency.

9

Feldman, Lyon and Willardson (2000) summarize legal aspects of the FSMA.
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If these bond ratings falls below investment grade then new expansion projects cannot be
undertaken.
The merger opportunity created by the GLBA will benefit some lines of insurance
business more than others. Johnston and Madura (2000) points out that banks will be
interested in the cross selling of insurance products that complement banking products;
for example, mortgage and mortgage insurance, auto financing and auto insurance.
Saunders and Walter (1994), on the other hand, conclude that greater synergistic gains
are available for a combination of banks and life insurers than from combinations of
banks and property/causality insurers.
Hypothesis 5: The GLBA is more favorable towards larger banks.
Size is regarded as an important factor in the financial institution literature. Barth
et al (2000) and Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) argue that the GLBA benefit larger banking
institutions. We argue that even after controlling for all industry specific characteristics
the big firms will be the biggest beneficiaries of this law.

2.4

Methodology

In this paper we use both market return and balance sheet information of banks to
test the above hypotheses. The stock price reaction of regulatory changes is estimated
using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model of Zellner (1962). A similar method is
used in other studies10.

10

Schipper and Thompson (1983), Binder (1985a,b, and 1988), Rose (1985), Smith, Bradley and Jarrell
(1986), Cornett and Tehranian (1989,1990), Hendershott, Lee and Tompkins (2000).
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Table 1: Money Center Banks and Super Regional Banks*
Money Center Banks
BankAmerica
Bank One Corp.
Bankers Trust
Chase Manhattan
Citigroup
J.P. Morgan

Super Regional Banks
BankBoston Corp
Bank of New York Co.
First Union Corp
Republic NY Corp
State Street Corp

*

Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) in its quarterly statistical release
December 31, 1998.

We use two different sets of portfolios to test our first five hypotheses. The first
set of portfolios includes Money Center Banks, Super Regional Banks11 (a list of these
banks are presented in table 1) and other banks that meet our sampling criterion. The
second set of portfolios consists of banks that had a Section 20 subsidiary prior to the
GLBA and banks that now have a financial subsidiary but did not before the GLBA. The
list of banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and banks that now have a financial subsidiary
are presented in table 2. All the information about the banks with a Section 20 subsidiary
and banks that now have a new Financial Subsidiary are obtained from the Federal
Reserve Bulletins and web site.
We use an extension of the standard market model. Lag values of the market
index are used in our model to address the possible nonsynchronous trading effect. We
use dummy variables to identify the major events that led to the passage of the GLBA.
The dummy variable is equal to 1 over the event window and zero otherwise. The

11

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) in its quarterly statistical release
publishes the name of Money Center Banks and Other large banks (which is used in the literature as Super
regional Banks). In this study we use the banks categorized as Money Center Banks and Super Regional
Banks as of December 31, 1998 in FFIEC statistical release. This is presented in table 1.
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coefficient estimate associated with the dummy variable measures the impact of the event
on the portfolio return. We use the three factors model used in the banking literature12.
Table 2: Banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and banks that now have a Financial
Subsidiary but never had a Section 20 subsidiary.
Banks that had Section 20 subsidiary before Banks that never had Section 20 subsidiary
the GLBA
but now have Financial Subsidiary
CULLEN/FROST BANKERS, INC.
MARINE MIDLAND BKS INC
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP
SOVRAN FINANCIAL CORP
FIRST SECURITY BANCORP
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER CORP
FIRST STATE BANCSHARES, INC.
SECURITY PACIFIC CORP
HIBERNIA CORPORATION
LIBERTY NATIONAL BANCORP INC
INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORP.
FIRST CHICAGO CORP
NBT BANCORP INC.
BANK SOUTH CORP
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP.
FIRST INTERSTATE BANCORP
SOUTHTRUST CORPORATION
DAUPHIN DEPOSIT CORP
STATE STREET CORPORATION
BARNETT BANKS INC
U.S. BANCORP
FIRST OF AMERICA BANK CORP
UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORPORATION
CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP
WACHOVIA CORPORATION
BANKAMERICA CORP
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
CRESTAR FINANCIAL CORP
BANKERS TRUST CORP
BANKBOSTON CORP
REPUBLIC NEW YORK CORP
B B & T CORP
B O K FINANCIAL CORP
BANK NEW YORK INC
BANK ONE CORP
CHASE MANHATTAN CORP NEW
CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP
CITIGROUP INC
COMMERCE BANCORP INC NJ
FIRST UNION CORP
FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC
KEYCORP NEW
MELLON FINANCIAL CORP
MORGAN J P & CO INC
NATIONAL CITY CORP
P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC
SUNTRUST BANKS INC
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP
Source: Federal Reserve, December 1999.

12

Wetmore and Brick (1994) and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992)
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Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of firms in the same industry
measured over a common time period are contemporaneously correlated because the
firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So, in events such as regulatory
changes, the residuals will not be ‘iid’ (identically and independently distributed). If
there is a contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances across equations but not
correlated over time, the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) model estimates will be
more efficient then the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimates. Thus, we use the SUR
to estimate the following models.
2.4.1

Overall Impact of the Law
We estimate the following model in order to test for the winners and losers in the

banking industry.
Rit = α i + α i′D + β i1 Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt + β i 4 Rmt −2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D
+ β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rft + κ i Rrt + γ i DGt + eit

(1)

Here, Rit = return on portfolio i (=1,2,3) on day t (T=2780 daily observations from
January 1990 to December 2000). Rmt = Return on CRSP value weighted index at time t.
αi = the intercept coefficient for portfolio i. βi1-βi3 = market risk coefficient for portfolio i.
βi4-βi6 = measures the change in the exposure to systematic risk. δi = foreign exchange
risk coefficient for portfolio i. κi = the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. Dt =
dummy variable which is equal to 1 in every event window and zero otherwise. eit = the
random disturbances. D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the enactment of the
regulation (after 11/21/99). DG is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 over every event
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window and zero otherwise. γi captures the average impact of the regulation on portfolio
i.
2.4.2

Impact of Individual Events on Portfolios
In order to test for hypotheses surrounding the events we estimate the following

model.
Rit = α i + α i′D + β i1 Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt
K

+ β i 4 Rmt − 2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D + β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rft + κ i Rrt + ∑ γ ik Dkt + eit

(2)

k =1

Here, Dkt is the dummy variable which is equal to one on event window k and
zero otherwise, so γik captures the average impact of kth announcement on portfolio i.

2.4.3

Specification test
We present a simple specification test to verify our extended model. Specification

tests in this case involve testing for correlation across portfolios; this is the same as
testing the hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of S (variance-covariance matrix)
are zero. There are two such specification tests in the literature, the Likelihood Ratio
(LR) test and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The statistics in both cases are χ2
distributed. Berndt and Savin (1977) demonstrate that the following inequality holds:

LM ≤ LR

(3)

between these statistics. Since we have the same asymptotic distribution, the LM
test rejects less often than the LR test. We will use the LR test to check for the
diagonality of the variance-covariance matrix. Excluding the diagonal elements, there are

45

1/2m∗(m-1) unknown parameters in S and these can be arranged in vector θ. The null
hypothesis that we will test is:

H:θ = 0

(4)

This test is based on the following statistics

m

ˆ |]
λ LR = T [ ∑ log σˆ i2 − log | ∑

(5)

i −1

2
ˆ is the
where σˆ i is ei′ei / T from the individual least squares regressions and ∑

maximum likelihood estimator S. This statistic has a limiting χ2 distribution with
1/2m∗(m-1) degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis.
2.4.4

Testable Hypotheses
In addition to the major hypotheses that are presented in the previous section, we

also test for the following hypotheses based on the portfolio model. They are13:
Hypothesis 6: γ1k = γ2k = γ3k (i.e. abnormal returns for each portfolio is jointly
equal on each event window k.)
Hypothesis 7: γ i1 = γ i 2 = ... = γ i13 (i.e. all abnormal returns for each portfolio i are
jointly equal).

2.5
2.5.1

Data and Event Selection

Firm Selection
We use the SIC classification from COMPUSTAT (Research Insight) to identify

the commercial banks (SIC 6021 and 6022) to create our portfolios. The return
information for this study comes from the CRSP tape, while the balance sheet
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information comes from COMPUSTAT. We require these firms to have no missing
trading for at least 3 years, from January 1998 to December 2000. In order to match firms
from COMPUSTAT and CRSP we omitted all firms with exchange codes 4 to 10, since
CRSP only has return information of firms traded either on the NYSE, AMEX or
NASDAQ. We required the firms to have balance sheet information from 1997 to 1999.
Our final sample that match these criterions is presented in table 3; panel A presents our
first set of banking portfolios and panel B which presents our second set of portfolios.

Table3. The number of firms in each of the portfolios and sub portfolios.
Panel A
Sub-Industry
Portfolios
a. Money Center
Banks
b. Super Regional
Banks
c. All Other banks
Total Banks

No. Of
Firms

Panel B
Sub-Industry Portfolios
3 a. Banks with a Section 20 subsidiary.

4 b. Banks that never had a Section 20 but
now have a Financial Subsidiary.
336 c. All Other banks.
343 Total Banks

No. Of
Firms
17
13
313
343

We use return information of the sample firms from January 1998 to December
2000 to estimate each of our models.
2.5.2

Macro variables
Data for the two macro-economic variables used in our study is obtained from the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System14. For foreign exchange we used the
Major Country Index15 from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The
return is calculated using the following formula16:

13

14

15

Similar hypotheses were tested by Binder (1985a) and Cornett and Tehranian (1990).
All the information is available online from http://www.federalreserve.gov
The major currencies index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar
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Rf t =

Ft − Ft −1
Ft −1

(6)

Here, Ft is the value of the Major Country Index at time t. To be consistent with
the literature,17 we use the one-year T-bill rate as a proxy for the interest rate. Interest rate
returns are computed using the following formula18:
Rrt =

Rt − Rt −1
Rt −1

(7)

Here, Rt is the interest rate on one year t-bill at time t. Actual returns are used
because there is no difference in the results regardless of whether interest rates are
anticipated19; also, we do not orthogonalize the indices20.
2.5.3

Event Selection
The selection of events in a regulatory event is much more difficult than standard

studies that concern corporate announcements, as argued by Binder (1985a). We use
LexisNexis wire service to retrieve all news regarding the GLBA. Our search period
started November 1, 1998 (Senator Gramm took over as chair of The Senate Banking
Committee) and extended to November 12, 1999 (president Clinton signed the bill into
law). Our basic search resulted in more than 600 different news items from the
LexisNexis database. In table 4 we summarize the important events and dates.

against a subset of currencies in the broad index that circulate widely outside the country of issue. The
weights are derived from those in the broad index.
16

Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994).
Kane and Unal (1998), Flannery and James (1984), and Wetmore and Brick (1994).
18
Same as that used by Wetmore and Brick (1994).
19
Flannery and James (1984).
20
Giliberto (1985) argues that orthogonalizing the indices results in biased estimators. Moreover not
apparent which index is the driving index and which is the driven one., Kane and Unal (1998) argue that it
is
17
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Table 4: Timeline of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The
second column 'Event' describes the main event.

Date

Event

11/4/98

1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato lost his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator
Gramm to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98).

1/8/99

2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress.

2/17/99

3. Draft bill was unveiled in the Senate.

4/12/99

4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill.

4/28/99

5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the
Senate.

5/4/99

6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill.

05/06/99 –
Midnight

7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed.

7/1/99

8. House version of the bill was passed.

10/15/99

9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation.

10/22/99

10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA.

11/02/99

11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way
for the votes in both the House and the Senate.

11/4/99

12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57).

11/12/99

13. President Clinton signs the bill into law.
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Table 5: Estimation of Overall impact of the law.
In this table we estimate the overall impact of the law using the model presented by equation 1.
Rit = α i + β i1Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt + β i 4 Rmt − 2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D + β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rrt + κ i Rf t + γ i DGt + eit

The model is estimated using the SUR methodology. DG is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 over all the events and zero otherwise so the coefficient of DG,
i.e. γ captures the overall impact of GLB and D is the dummy which is equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation (11/12/99) and zero otherwise.
Panel A:
Panel B:
Banks with a
Financial Subsidiary
Super Regional
Banks with a Section
that never had a
Money Center Banks
Banks
All other Banks
20 subsidiary
Section 20 subsidiary
All other Banks
Parameter
Estimate t-stat
Estimate t-stat Estimate
t-stat Estimate
t-stat Estimate
t-stat Estimate
t-stat
0.000
-0.693 0.000
0.294
0.000
1.050
0.000
-0.066
0.000
1.233
0.000
0.497
α
D
0.000
0.088 0.001
0.686
0.000
0.691
0.000
0.733
0.000
0.643
0.000
0.138
α∗

β1
β2
β3
β4
β5
β6
γ
δ
κ
R2

-0.044

-1.402 -0.023

-0.774

-0.020

-1.091

-0.036

-1.130 -0.017

-0.569

0.027

1.476

1.307 *** 41.425 1.193 *** 40.544

0.911 *** 49.243

-0.038

-1.543

-0.042 *

-1.685

-0.056 **

-2.295

-0.017

-0.691

1.170 *** 47.843

1.077 *** 42.756

-0.006
0.095 ***

-0.301
5.126

0.844 *** 45.684

-0.171 ***

-2.828 -0.192 ***

-3.407

-0.164 ***

-4.615

-0.188 ***

-3.988

-0.132 ***

-2.733

-0.169 ***

-4.781

-0.154 **

-2.554 -0.122 **

-2.164

-0.206 ***

-5.809

-0.129 ***

-2.750

-0.209 ***

-4.324

-0.232 ***

-6.553

-0.529 ***
0.008 ***
0.057
-0.085 ***

-8.743
3.670
0.911
-3.398

-8.027
2.452
0.416
-3.300

-0.260 ***
0.004 ***
0.053
-0.047 ***

-7.311
2.844
1.436
-3.167

-0.442 ***
0.006 ***
0.036
-0.088 ***

-9.414
3.389
0.736
-4.541

-0.470 ***
0.004 **
0.031
-0.077 ***

-9.710
2.445
0.625
-3.812

-0.151 ***
0.004 ***
0.078 **
-0.021

-4.247
3.339
2.124
-1.400

-0.454 ***
0.005 **
0.024
-0.078 ***

0.431
0.421
0.531
N
3
4
336
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

0.506
17

0.445
13

0.509
313
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2.6
2.6.1

Empirical Results

Overall impact of the law
Table 5 presents the results from estimation of overall impact of the law. The

results for this estimation of our first set of portfolios is presented in panel A. Money
Center Banks have the highest gain from this law of 0.80% (average abnormal return),
which is significant at the 1% level, Super Regional Banks have a gain of 0.50%, which
is also significant at the 1% level. The portfolio of all other banks had a gain of 0.4%
(significant at the 1% level). These results support our second hypothesis that the big
banking firms have more to gain from the GLBA. We also test whether the overall impact
of the act for any two portfolios are equal. These results are presented in panel A of table
6. These are all Wald tests and based on the model presented by equation 4. In all three
pairs of Wald tests we find that the null hypothesis in which the economic impact on any
two portfolios are equal are rejected at the 1% level.
Panel B of table 5 presents the overall impact on the second classification of
banking portfolios. We find that banks that have a Section 20 subsidiary have a higher
overall gain (a cumulative average abnormal return of 0.60%). These results support our
third hypothesis that banks experienced with non-banking activities (banks with the
Section 20 investment subsidiary), benefit more due to the passage of the law. We also
test whether the overall impact of the law for any two portfolios is equal. These results
are presented in panel B of table 6. In all the three pair tests, we find that the null
hypothesis in which the economic impact on any two portfolios are equal are rejected.

51
Table 6. Test of the hypothesis that all abnormal returns for each portfolio are jointly
equal to zero.
Column 2 of this table presents the Wald test for Hypothesis 10, which measures the significance of
portfolio returns for all 13 announcements jointly. The underlying distribution is a χ2 with 1 degree of
freedom.
Wald test
2
Null Hypothesis
χ (1)

Panel B

Panel A

1. Money Center Banks and Super Regional Banks have the same impact due to this law.
2. Money Center Banks and portfolio of all the other banks have the same impact due to
this law.
3. Super Regional Banks and portfolio of all the other banks have the same impact due to
this law.
1. Banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and Banks with a Financial subsidiary that never had
a Section 20 subsidiary have the same impact due to this law.
2. Banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and portfolio of all other banks have the same impact
due to this law.
3. Banks with a Financial Subsidiary that never has a Section 20 subsidiary and portfolio of
all other banks have the same impact due to this law.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

2.6.2

6.567**
9.670***
5.150**
5.273**
9.067***
5.904**

Impact of the Act on Systematic Risk
Table 5 shows that the shift in the exposure to systematic risk is negative and

significant for all portfolios in both the categories. This confirms our fifth hypothesis that
the diversification opportunity and measures to restrict excessive risk taking have
reduced the exposure to systematic risk.
2.6.3

Other Hypotheses
The main advantage of using the SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression)

methodology is the ability to do joint hypothesis testing since heteroscedasticity across
equations and contemporaneous dependence of the disturbances are explicitly
incorporated into the hypothesis test. The following hypothesis tests are based on the
estimation of the model presented in equation 2.
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Table 7: Estimation of modified Market model with 3 portfolio of banking industry and
test of hypothesis 6
Panel A of the following table presents the estimation results of the following model:
K

Rit = α i + β i1 Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt + β i 4 Rmt − 2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D + β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rrt + κ i Rf t + ∑ γ ik Dkt + eit
k =1

for portfolios of Money Center Banks, Super Regional Banks and all other banks in our sample. The
model is estimated using SUR. Dkt is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 over the event windows, and
the estimate of coefficient of the dummy i.e. γik presents the estimate of the cumulative average abnormal
return of the kth event. Rm represents the return of market index, δi is foreign exchange risk coefficient for
portfolio i and κi is the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. D is a dummy variable which is equal to
1 after the enactment of the regulation (11/12/99) and zero otherwise. Panel B presents the test of the
hypothesis that the events have symmetric impact across the industry.
Panel A
Money Center Banks

Event parameters

Model Parameters

Parameter

Estimate

t-stat

Super Regional Banks
Estimate

t-stat

All Other Banks
Estimate

Panel B
Wald test
2

χ (3)

t-stat

α

0.000

-0.680

0.000

0.296

0.000

1.038

α∗

0.000

0.084

0.001

0.689

0.000

0.699

β1

-0.049

-1.558

-0.022

-0.754

-0.020

-1.087

β2

-0.037

-1.174

-0.016

-0.541

0.030

1.610

β3

1.305***

41.429

1.192***

40.515

0.912***

49.341

β4

-0.166***

-2.745

-0.193***

-3.420

-0.164***

-4.620

β5

-0.152**

-2.533

-0.123**

-2.181

-0.208***

-5.891

β6

-0.528***

-8.745

-0.452***

-8.017

-0.261***

-7.364

δ

0.054

0.861

0.021

0.364

0.050

1.370

κ

-0.089***

-3.528

-0.078***

-3.325

-0.047***

-3.177

γ1

0.019***

2.618

0.016**

2.388

0.008*

1.780

8.098**

γ2

0.024***

3.251

-0.002

-0.290

-0.005

-1.071

27.811***

γ3

0.015**

2.017

0.009

1.317

0.009**

2.032

5.177

γ4

-0.001

-0.070

0.005

0.784

0.009**

2.093

7.866**

γ5

0.012*

1.691

0.021***

3.096

0.012***

2.709

10.483***

γ6

-0.004

-0.424

-0.010

-1.219

0.000

0.070

3.116

γ7

-0.003

-0.322

0.008

0.936

-0.002

-0.333

3.119

γ8

-0.001

-0.177

0.001

0.112

-0.004

-0.992

2.300

γ9

0.000

0.045

-0.001

-0.190

0.002

0.495

0.815

γ10

0.017**

2.338

-0.001

-0.089

0.005

1.159

9.249**

γ11

0.007

0.742

-0.003

-0.323

0.005

0.930

3.025

γ12

0.009

1.028

0.010

1.218

0.003

0.661

1.810

γ13

0.001

0.184

0.006

0.843

0.002

0.526

0.875

R2

0.434
0.425
N
3
4
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

0.534
336
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Panel A of Table 7 presents the SUR estimation results, cumulative average
abnormal return and corresponding t-statistics for each of the 13 events for the three
portfolios. It also presents model parameter estimates; market betas (current and lag),
foreign exchange risk coefficients (δ) and interest rate risk coefficients (κ). Panel B
presents the results of hypothesis 6 for our first classification of banking firms.
Five events produced significant cumulative average abnormal returns for the
Money Center Banks. The news of Senator Gramm taking over as Senate Banking
Committee Chair on November 4, 1998 created an average abnormal return of 1.9%.
When the Financial Services Reform bill was reintroduced in Congress on January 8,
1999, Money Center Banks experienced an average abnormal return of 2.4% (significant
at the 1% level). Moreover, when the draft of the bill was unveiled in the Congress,
Money Center Banks had a 1.5% average abnormal return. The fourth event was when
the Senate Banking Committee formally filed the Financial Services Modernization Act
with Congress on April 12, 1999, and there was a 1.2% average abnormal return. The
fifth event occurred is when Senator Gramm made a deal with the White House on the
CRA provision on October 22, 1999, which virtually removed the last big hurdle to the
passage of the GLBA, and the average abnormal return (AR) on this event was 1.1% and
significant at the 10% level.
On the other hand, Super Regional Banks only had significant stock market
reactions on two different occasions. The first of these events was the news of Senator
Alfonse D’Amoto’s loss of his New York re-election on November 3, 1998 coupled with
the news of Senator Gramm’s appointment as Senate Banking Committee chair on
November 4, 1998. These events together produced an abnormal return of 1.6%. The
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second event was when the Senate Banking Committee formally filed the Financial
Services Modernization Act with Congress on April 12, 1999, and there was a 2.1%
average abnormal return.
In addition to the events where Super Regional Banks have significant stock
market reactions, the portfolio of all other banks have significant cumulative average
abnormal returns on 2 additional occasions. First, when the draft bill was unveiled in the
Senate on February 17, 1999 there was only a 0.9% abnormal return, which is significant
at the 5% level. Second, when Senator Gramm met with the minority leaders to work on
the bill, there was a reaction of 1.2%.
Panel B of Table 7 presents the Wald test for Hypothesis 7 for each of the
announcements. This hypothesis tests whether the information produced during the kth
event window has the same impact over all three portfolios. The null hypothesis is:
H0:γik =0 ∀ i
As reported in the table, in events 1, 2, 4, 5 and 10 the χ2 test statistics are 8.098,
27.811, 7.866, 10.483, and 9.249 respectively, which rejects the null hypotheses. This
means that over these five events windows, the impact of the announcement is
asymmetric across the three portfolios.
For our second set of portfolios, the SUR estimation results, cumulative average
abnormal return and corresponding t-statistics for each of the 13 events for the three
portfolios are presented in Table 8.
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Table 8: Estimation of modified Market model with 3 portfolio of banking industry and
test of hypothesis 6
Panel A of the following table presents the estimation results of the following model:
K

Rit = α i + β i1 Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt + β i 4 Rmt − 2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D + β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rrt + κ i Rf t + ∑ γ ik Dkt + eit
k =1

for portfolios of banks that had a Section 20 subsidiary, banks that now have the new Financial Subsidiary
and all other banks in our sample. The model is estimated using SUR. Dkt is a dummy variable which is
equal to 1 over the event windows, and the estimate of the coefficient of the dummy, i.e. γik, presents the
estimate of the cumulative average abnormal return of the kth event. Rm represents the return of market
index, . δi is foreign exchange risk coefficient for portfolio i and κi is the interest rate risk coefficient for
portfolio i. D is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation (11/12/99) and
zero otherwise. Panel B presents the test of the hypothesis that the events have symmetric impact across the
industry.
Panel A
Banks that never has a
Banks that had a Section 20 Section 20 but have a
subsidiary
section 4K4E subsidiary

Event parameters

Model Parameters

Parameter

α
α
β1
β2
β3
β4
β5

Estimate

t-stat

Estimate

t-stat

Panel B
Wald test
All Other Banks
Estimate

t-stat

2

χ (3)

0.000

-0.063

0.000

1.209

0.000

0.508

0.000

0.734

0.000

0.657

0.000

0.136

-0.039

-1.591

-0.039

-1.566

-0.009

-0.465

-0.055**

-2.278

-0.012

-0.460

0.095***

5.124

1.170***

47.840

1.078***

42.848

0.844***

45.684

-0.186***

-3.960

-0.135***

-2.796

-0.166***

-4.695

-0.129***

-2.758

-0.214***

-4.452

-0.232***

-6.564

β6

-0.442***

-9.429

-0.471***

-9.760

-0.151***

-4.253

δ
κ
γ1

0.034

0.694

0.026

0.513

0.076**

2.065

-0.090***

-4.586

-0.077***

-3.862

-0.022

-1.467

0.015***

2.621

0.014**

2.388

0.008*

1.831

7.521*

γ2

0.003

0.542

-0.008

-1.350

0.007*

1.717

15.056***

γ3

0.009

1.573

0.015***

2.717

0.009**

2.104

8.132**

γ4

0.010*

1.692

0.003

0.576

0.004

0.816

3.794

γ5

0.016***

2.863

0.013**

2.277

0.009**

2.182

8.301**

γ6

-0.002

-0.308

0.001

0.194

-0.004

-0.702

1.348

γ7

-0.001

-0.188

0.001

0.164

-0.002

-0.307

0.392

γ8

0.000

-0.076

-0.008

-1.412

-0.002

-0.501

3.810

γ9

0.002

0.301

0.005

0.820

-0.001

-0.196

1.732

γ01

0.004

0.718

0.007

1.214

0.009**

2.201

6.471*

γ11

0.005

0.716

0.001

0.113

0.006

1.074

1.965

γ21

0.010

1.441

0.001

0.070

0.004

0.768

4.000

γ31
R2
N

0.001

0.123

0.004

0.741

0.003

0.741

1.341

0.508155

0.448447

0.511568

17

13

313

***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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It also presents model parameter estimates for the market betas (current and lag),
foreign exchange risk coefficient (δ) and interest rate risk coefficient (κ). Panel B
presents the results of hypothesis 6
Banks that had a Section 20 subsidiary have highly significant abnormal return
(1% level) on two different occasions. First is the news of Senator Alfonse D’Amoto’s
loss of his New York re-election on November 3, 1998, coupled with the news of Senator
Gramm’s succession to become Senate Banking Committee chair on November 4, 1998
and when the Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services
Modernization Act in the Senate on April 28, 1999. These banks had a moderate reaction
to the news that Senator Gramm will meet with the minority leaders to work on the bill.
On the other hand, banks with a new Financial Subsidiary have highly significant
abnormal returns on three different events. These events are events 1, 3, and 5. The
cumulative average abnormal returns on these events are 1.4%, 1.5%, and 1.3%.
The portfolio of all other banks in this category has significant cumulative
average abnormal returns on six different occasions. The first of these events was the
news of Senator Alfonse D’Amoto’s loss of his New York re-election on November 3,
1998 coupled with the news of Senator Gramm’s succession to become Senate Banking
Committee chair on November 4, 1998 that has an average return of 0.8%. When the
Financial Services Reform Bill was reintroduced in Congress on January 8, 1999, it has
an average return of 0.7%. The third event was when the draft bill was unveiled in
Congress on February 17, 1999 and it created an average abnormal return of 0.9%. The
fourth event was when the Senate Banking Committee formally filed the Financial
Services Modernization Act in the Senate; it created an average return of 0.9%. The fifth
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event was when Senator Gramm made a deal with the White House on the CRA
(Community Reinvestment Act) virtually removing the large big hurdle to the GLBA on
October 22, 1999 and it created an average abnormal return of 0.9% for the portfolio.
The null hypothesis that the events have created symmetric impact on these
portfolios is rejected at five different counts, events 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10. This hypothesis is
tested using a Wald test. The underlying distribution is χ2(3). This result is presented in
Panel B of Table 8.
Table 9: Test of the hypothesis that all the announcements have same impact on the
portfolios of the banking industry.
Column 2 of this table presents the Wald test for Hypothesis 7 which measures the significance of portfolio
returns for all 13 announcements jointly. The underlying distribution is a χ2 with 13 degrees of freedom.
Wald test

Panel B

Panel A

2
Null Hypothesis
χ (13)
All abnormal returns for Money Center Banks are jointly
equal to zero.
31.473***
All abnormal returns for Super Regional Banks are jointly
equal to zero.
22.387**
All abnormal returns for portfolio of all other banks are
jointly equal to zero.
24.341**
All abnormal returns for Banks with a Section 20
subsidiary are jointly equal to zero.
23.854**
All abnormal returns for Banks with a Financial Subsidiary
are jointly equal to zero.
25.156**
All abnormal returns for portfolio of all other banks are
jointly equal to zero.
23.900**
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Here we test whether every announcement has the same impact on the same
portfolio. We use the Wald test for this hypothesis test. The underlying distribution is χ2
with 13 degrees of freedom. The results for our first category of portfolios is presented in
Panel A and the results for the second set of portfolios are presented in Panel B of Table
9. The results for all six portfolios show that the null hypothesis is rejected. It implies
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that the events leading to the passage of the GLBA had different impacts on the different
portfolios.

2.6.4

Specification Tests
The result of the specification test for our portfolio model shows that the null

hypothesis H:θ =0 is rejected at the 1% level for two different portfolio categories. This
means that the variance covariance matrix is non-diagonal. Statistically this means that
SUR is the correct model to choose as opposed to the OLS.

2.7
2.7.1

Cross Sectional Analysis

Methodology
The goal of the cross-sectional models is to identify firm specific characteristics

that can help us explain the cross sectional variation in abnormal return.
2.7.1.1

Average Abnormal Return (AR)
In order to identify the firm specific characteristics, we first need to generate the

AR for each firm over each of the event windows of interest. To do this we use the exact
same model used for the portfolio study. Formally the model is:
Rit = α i + α i′D + β i1 Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt + β i 4 Rmt −2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D
K

+ β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rft + κ i Rrt + ∑ γ ik Dkt + eit

(8)

k =1

Here, Dkt is the dummy variable that equals 1 on each of the event windows and
zero otherwise. We also generate these ARs using a dummy that is equal to 1 for every
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event window and zero otherwise to measure the overall average return, using the
following model:

Rit = α i + α i′D + β i1 Rmt − 2 + β i 2 Rmt −1 + β i 3 Rmt + β i 4 Rmt −2 * D + β i 5 Rmt −1 * D
+ β i 6 Rmt * D + δ i Rft + κ i Rrt + γ i DGt + eit

(9)

We also generate the βi4-βi6 that we use in the cross-sectional regression.

2.7.2

Cross-sectional Model
In order to further investigate the characteristics of winner and losers in the

banking industry, we estimate an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model where the
dependent variable is the AR estimated using equation 8 or equation 9 (depending on
whether we are investigating an individual event or overall impact). We analyze an
individual event if two or more portfolios of any category have a significant return on
that event. The dependent variables are SIZE, ROA and shift in exposure to systematic
risk. We use the following models for our cross-sectional analysis:

ARi = θ + θ SIZE SIZE + θ SIZExMONEY ( SIZExMONEY ) + θ SIZExSUPER ( SIZExSUPER )
+θ ROA ROA + θ ROAxMONEY ( ROAxMONEY ) + θ ROAxSUPER ( ROAxSUPER)

(10)

+θ RISK RISK + θ RISKxMONEY ( RISKxMONEY ) + θ RISKxSUPER ( RISKxSUPER) + ξ
ARi = θ + θ SIZE SIZE + θ SIZExSEC 20 ( SIZExSEC 20) + θ SIZExSEC 4 K ( SIZExSEC 4 K )
+θ ROA ROA + θ ROAxSEC 20 ( ROAxSEC 20) + θ ROAxSEC 4 K ( ROAxSEC 4 K )

(11)

+θ RISK RISK + θ RISKxSEC 20 ( RISKxSEC 20) + θ RISKxSEC 4 K ( RISKxSEC 4 K ) + ξ

Here, SIZE is measured taking the log of the book value of assets. It is expected
that the bigger banks are going to have the best opportunity to exploit the economies of
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scope that the GLBA has to offer. Deregulation and court rulings (example: Section 20
subsidiary provision or rulings concerning the banks right to sell insurance products) that
deregulated the financial services industry mostly benefited the larger firms. Thus we
expect that SIZE should be positive and significant.
Return on Assets (ROA) is a measure of overall performance and we expect that
better performing banks are the best positioned to expand their business in this new
deregulated era. We expect this variable to be positive and significant. We also expect
that the change in the exposure to systematic risk will be negative implying that the
regulation has created diversification opportunities and also the regulation against
excessive risk taking has made the industry less prone to bankruptcy.

2.7.3

Empirical Results
Table 10 presents the estimation results of equation 11 (for our first category of

portfolios). We examine 3 different events and the overall impact in Table 10. For all 3
events and for overall impact, we find that the intercept is negative and significant. The
cross dummy between Money Center banks and the change in exposure to systematic risk
is highly significant and positive for events 1 and 5; for overall impact for this category
of banks, the exposure to systematic risk has increased, while in event 3 it decreased.
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Table 10: Cross sectional determinants of the impact for Money Center Banks, Super
Regional Banks and All other banks in the sample.
Cross-section regression for Money Center Banks, Super Regional Banks and all the other banks in our
sample. The table shows the estimation result of the following model:
ARi = θ + θ SIZE SIZE + θ SIZExMONEY ( SIZExMONEY ) + θ SIZExSUPER ( SIZExSUPER )
+θ ROA ROA + θ ROAxMONEY ( ROAxMONEY ) + θ ROAxSUPER ( ROAxSUPER )
+θ RISK RISK + θ RISKxMONEY ( RISKxMONEY ) + θ RISKxSUPER ( RISKxSUPER ) + ξ
Here AR is the average abnormal returns and θRiak is the change in the exposure to systematic risk are generated from equation 8 and
equation 9. MONEY and SUPER are dummy variables, which are equal to 1 if the bank is a Money Center Bank or if it is a Super
Regional Bank, and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured taking the log of the book value of asset; ROA is return on Asset. θSIZE is the
coefficient estimate of SIZE for all other firms, while θSIZExMONEY is the difference in coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for all other
firms with Money Center Banks and θSIZExSUPER is the difference in coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for all other firms with Super
Regional Banks. The coefficient estimates for ROA and RISK are defined likewise.

θ
θRISK
θ RISK x money
θ RISK x super
θ SIZE
θ SIZE x money
θ SIZE x super
θ ROA
θ ROA x money
θ ROA x super
R2
F

Panel A
Panel B
Event 1
Event 3
Event 5
Overall Impact
-0.371***
-0.356***
-0.557***
-0.004*
0.074

0.021

-0.011

0.001

23.058***

-2.611***

14.159***

0.169***

0.094

-0.849***

-0.856

-0.010***

0.0569***

0.050***

0.0777***

0.001***

0.207***

-0.031***

0.101***

0.001***

0.049

0.001

-0.018

-0.001*

0.008

0.014

0.081*

-0.003

12.141***

-1.027***

7.515***

0.090***

-0.252

-0.316***

0.020

0.001

0.083
3.329***

0.095
3.885***

0.150
6.520***

0.174
7.820***

***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

The change in exposure to systematic risk for Super Regional banks is negative
and highly significant in event 3 and for overall impact. The change in exposure to
systematic risk is not significant for the reference group (for all other banks in this
category). Size is positive and significant for the reference group in the three events and
for overall impact. The cross dummy between Money Center banks and size is highly
significant and positive in all cases except for event 3. The cross dummy between Money
Center banks and ROA is highly significant and positive in all the cases except for event
3. Profitability is moderately significant in event 5 for the reference group and the cross
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dummy between Super Regional banks and ROA is highly significant but negative in
event 3. Thus, SIZE, change in exposure to systematic risk, and overall performance can
explain the cross sectional wealth effects.
Table 11: Cross sectional determinants of the impact for banks with Section 20
subsidiary, banks that now have newly created Financial Subsidiary and all other banks
in our sample.
Cross-section regression for banks with Section 20 subsidiary, banks that now have newly created
Financial Subsidiary and all other banks in our sample. The table shows the estimation result of the
following model:
ARi = θ + θ SIZE SIZE + θ SIZExSEC 20 ( SIZExSEC 20) + θ SIZExSEC 4 K ( SIZExSEC 4 K )
+θ ROA ROA + θ ROAxSEC 20 ( ROAxSEC 20) + θ ROAxSEC 4 K ( ROAxSEC 4 K )
+θ RISK RISK + θ RISKxSEC 20 ( RISKxSEC 20) + θ RISKxSEC 4 K ( RISKxSEC 4 K ) + ξ

Here AR is the average abnormal returns and θRiak is the change in the exposure to systematic risk
generated from equation 8 and equation 9. SEC20 and SEC4k are dummy variables, which are equal to 1 if
the bank has a Section 20 subsidiary or a new FS respectively, and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured
taking the log of the book value of asset; ROA is the return on assets. θSIZE is the coefficient estimate of
SIZE for all other firms, while θSIZExsec20 is the difference in coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for all
other firms with banks that has sec 20 subsidiary and θSIZExsec4k is the difference in coefficient estimate of
SIZE variable for all other firms with banks that has a sec 4k subsidiary. The coefficient estimates for ROA
and RISK are defined likewise.
Panel A
Panel B
Event 1
Event 3
Event 5
Overall Impact
-0.355***
-0.346***
-0.544***
-0.004

θ
0.125
0.048
-0.012
θRISK
-0.179
-0.527*
-0.619***
θ RISK x sec20
-0.409
-0.285
0.188
θ RISK x sec4k
0.055***
0.049***
0.075***
θSIZE
0.038***
-0.006
-0.013
θSIZE x sec20
-0.063*
0.015
0.026
θSIZE x sec4k
0.003
0.014
0.086**
θROA
-0.279***
-0.085
-0.024
θROA x sec20
0.530*
-0.128
-0.182
θROA x sec4k
2
R
0.097
0.095
0.150
F
3.979***
3.876***
6.527***
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

0.002
-0.007**
-0.003*
0.001***
0.000
-0.001**
-0.003
0.000
0.005**
0.183
8.265***

Table 11 presents the estimation results of equation 12 (for our second category
of portfolios). We examined 3 different events and the overall impact in Table 11. For all
3 events the intercept is negative and significant. The change in exposure to systematic
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risk is insignificant for the reference group (banks that do not have either a Section 20
subsidiary or a new financial subsidiary), but is negative and significant for the cross
dummy between banks with a Section 20 subsidiary in events 3 and 5, and for overall
impact. The cross dummy for banks with a new financial subsidiary and the change in
exposure to systematic risk is negative and significant for overall impact. Size is positive
and significant for the reference group. The cross dummy between banks with a new
financial subsidiary and size is negative and significant in event 1 and for overall impact.
Profitability is significant in event 5 for the reference group. For this categorization, we
can also generalize that mainly SIZE, but also the change in exposure to systematic risk
and overall performance can explain the cross sectional wealth effects.

2.8

Conclusion

In this paper we investigate the impact of announcements that led to the passage
of the GLBA on the banking industry. We investigate the impact on this traditional
classification of banks like Money Center and Super Regional Banks. The results show
that Money Center Banks have the highest wealth effect followed by Super Regional
Banks. Due to the explicit measures taken by the GLBA and due to the diversification
opportunities, the exposure to systematic risk has reduced substantially for these two
categories of banks, as well as for the rest of the industry.
We also investigate the non-traditional classification of banks such as banks that
had a Section 20 subsidiary and banks that now have a new Financial Subsidiary. Our
results show that in this classification banks that had a Section 20 subsidiary were the
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biggest gainer and the change in exposure to systematic risk is also negative and
significant for all the categories of banks in this classification.
In the cross-section regression we find that larger firms are the most benefited
from this law, which is consistent with previous studies. However, the relation between
performance and wealth effect is not conclusive like some of the previous studies. The
most important contribution of this study is that we show how a change in exposure to
systematic risk can explain cross-sectional variation for Money Center banks, Super
Regional Banks, banks with a Section 20 subsidiary and banks with a new financial
subsidiary, which is significantly different from their reference group.

2.9
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Chapter III
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999: Market
Assessment of Winners and Losers in the Insurance Industry
3.1

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of the Financial Services Modernization Act
(GLBA) of 1999 on the insurance industry. We identify six events that have a differential
impact across the business lines of the insurance industry. The overall impact of the
GLBA across the business lines in the insurance industry is positive and the impact on
each business line is significantly different. Firms in property/casualty and life insurance
gain more than the rest of the firms in the insurance industry. Exposure to systematic risk
is reduced after the GLBA and this can explain the cross-sectional variation of the wealth
effect. In cross-sectional analysis we also find, consistent with merger literature, that
larger and poorly performing firms benefit from the cross-industry merger opportunities
under the GLBA.

3.2

Introduction

The Financial Services Modernization Act also known as Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA) of 1999 is the most sweeping deregulation of the U.S. financial services
industry in the last century. The GLBA repeals both the depression era Glass-Steagall act
of 1933, which separated banking and securities activities, and the Bank Holding
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Company Act of 1956 that prohibited bank holding companies from engaging in
insurance related activities.

Conventional wisdom suggests that while deregulation

creates overall shareholder value, the wealth effects of regulatory change are unevenly
distributed. We focus on the prediction that shareholders benefit from risk reduction
under the GLBA due to regulatory changes and newly created merger opportunities
across financial services.
Research in this area borrows from the Mergers and Acquisitions literature to
identify potential winners and losers as the GLBA allows for mergers between firms in
different sectors of the financial services industry.1 Larger firms will likely benefit from
the GLBA as they have more available resources to acquire firms across industries and
achieve economies of scope. Poorly performing firms will become the likely targets, as
these poorly managed firms can be purchased at a discount. Deregulation affords firms
the opportunity to diversify across financial sectors. Within the insurance industry those
product lines that are easily cross-marketed will be more attractive merger targets.
Current research finds that the GLBA does not have a uniform effect on the
financial services industry. Studies consistently find that the GLBA positively affects
shareholder value in the insurance industry; however, depending on the sample size and
number of events investigated, the results for other financial services industries are
mixed. Carow and Heron (2002) find that only the insurance industry gains from this
law. Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) find that all the sectors of the Financial Services
Industry (FSI) benefit from this law, while Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002)
conclude that this law doesn’t impact the banking industry. Larger banks with experience
1

Jensen and Ruback (1983) provides a survey of this literature.
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in the insurance business are likely to expand their business by acquiring insurance
companies.2

Houston and Ryngaert (1994) find that target firms typically sell at

premiums and acquiring firms sell at discounts. Carow (2001b), and Johnston and
Madura (2000) who investigate the only bank-to-insurance merger (Citicorp and
Travelers, 1998) find significantly positive returns for insurance companies.
Size is important for exploiting merger opportunities. For example, Hawawini
and Swary (1990) find that acquirers are significantly larger than targets. Calem (1994)
finds that after bank holding company branching reforms, large banks acquired small
banks. In addition, Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989), and Palia (1993) find that larger
acquiring firms add more to target bank value.
There is evidence that poorly performing firms become potential targets for
mergers. BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) find that timely mergers in the insurance industry
serve as an alternative to insolvency in 20% to 46% of the mergers considered in their
study. Similarly Whiting (1997) argues that banking organizations with higher ROEs
(Return on Equity) or ROAs (Return on Asset) are more likely to purchase insurers that
have lower ROE or ROA. Swary (1986) shows that target banks with higher capital ratios
than their bidder banks have greater abnormal returns. Thus, it seems that abolishing
cross-industry merger barriers will create wealth effects for poorly performing firms.
The GLBA may create diversification benefits for the financial services industry
by removing merger barriers. Wall, Reichert and Mohanty (1993) investigate whether
combinations of bank and non-bank firms can reduce a banking organizations’ operating
2 The presence of banking firms in the insurance business before passage of the GLBA is also very strong.
For example, Wells Fargo runs the seventh largest insurance agency in the U.S.A. and 50% to 65%
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risk. They conclude that the best opportunity for diversification gains is for banks to
merge with firms engaged in some aspects of the insurance industry. Boyd, Graham and
Hewitt (1993), using simulated data, find that bank holding company (BHC) mergers
with life and property/casualty insurance companies reduce risk.
The GLBA also reduces risk by providing safeguards against excessive risktaking. Under the GLBA, certain activities are restricted; while some activities are
limited to the subsidiaries, the GLBA also establishes financial health criteria for
expanding business into other sectors, assigns the Federal Reserve Board (FED) to
supervise and regulate Financial Holding Companies (FHCs) and gives the FED access to
risk data across the entire organization.3 The GLBA has provisions to use market signals
to discipline institutions.

Moreover, the GLBA proposes that the FED study the

feasibility and appropriateness of requiring large banks to issue subordinated debt that
will be rated by a major rating agency. Accordingly, if these bond ratings fall below
investment grade, then new expansion projects cannot be undertaken.
The merger opportunities created by the GLBA will benefit some lines of
insurance business more than others. Johnston and Madura (2000) point out that banks
will be interested in cross-selling of insurance products that closely resemble banking
products. For example: mortgage and mortgage insurance, auto financing and auto
insurance.

Saunders and Walter (1994), on the other hand, conclude that greater

synergistic gains are available for combination of banks and life insurers than from
combinations of banks and property/casualty insurers.

(depending on the method of calculation) of all banking organizations sell insurance products of one kind
or another (LaRocco, 1999).
3 Feldman, Lyon and Willardson (2000) summarize legal aspects of the GLBA.
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The main contribution of this paper is to empirically examine the diversification
opportunities made available under the GLBA. No study to date has investigated whether
the posited reductions in operating risk and bankruptcy risk, due to diversification
opportunity and safeguards against excessive risk-taking, can create value for
stockholders.4 We concentrate on the insurance industry for our analysis because the
GLBA allows the first opportunity for insurance companies to merge with other types of
financial services firms and the literature has identified a consistent wealth effect in the
insurance industry. We also test the predictions of Johnston and Madura (2000) and
Saunders and Walter (1994) that life and property insurance make more suitable merger
candidates than other lines of insurance businesses, thus firms in these lines of insurance
business will become suitable targets.
First, we adapted the model used by Blinder (1985), and Cornett and Tehranian
(1990), which evolves testing the impact of regulatory changes using financial market
data in a seemingly unrelated regression framework. We extend these models from a
one-factor model to a three-factor model that is commonly used in the banking literature.5
These factors are market exposure, foreign exchange risk exposure and interest rate risk
exposure. The foreign exchange risk component is applicable to insurance in general,
and property/casualty insurance in particular because of the globalization of U.S.
businesses. Interest rate exposure arises from the mismatch in duration of the assets and
liabilities of the firms. All financial institutions tend to mismatch their balance sheet

4 Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), investigate whether the risk shifts on the event date and they find no
evidence of risk shift for either the insurance or banking industry.
5 Wetmore and Brick (1994) and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992).
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maturities to some degree.6 This risk arises from the difference in timing of rate changes
and cash flows, and from changes in the shape of the yield curve.
In our cross-sectional analysis we include: log of book value of total assets to test
the size related hypothesis, return on equity to test the performance related hypothesis,
and change in exposure to systematic risk to analyze whether shareholders benefit from
risk reduction and diversification opportunities. In order to analyze the interaction effect
we include size, ROE and change in exposure to systematic risk multiplied by business
line dummies. We also include the difference in intercept for different business lines in
the insurance industry.
In the portfolio analysis we find that shifts in exposure to market beta are negative
and significant for all the portfolios. Each of the business line portfolios has a positive
overall wealth effect. Property/casualty and life insurance portfolios have higher gains
from the GLBA, and these wealth effects are significantly different from each other. We
also find that six different events have a statistically different impact across the business
lines.
In cross-sectional analysis, we find that firms in the property/casualty insurance
and all other insurance portfolio (except life insurance firms) benefit from risk reduction
under the GLBA. Our results also strongly support the general findings of the merger
literature. We find that larger firms, irrespective of the business line, gain from this
deregulation. Poorly performing firms in the life and property/casualty insurance
industries benefit from the GLBA.

6

Anthony Saunders(1998) pp. 120-121.
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The rest of the study is organized as follows. The second section provides an
historical overview. Section three introduces major hypotheses and describes the
methodology. Section four describes the data and lists the major events. Section five
presents the empirical results. Section six discusses the cross-sectional analysis and a
final section concludes.

3.3

History of the GLBA

Bank entry into the insurance business started in 1985 with the OCC (Office of
the Comptroller of Currency) ruling that allows banks to sell variable rate annuities. The
scope of bank activity in the insurance business widened further in 1986, based on
Section 92 of the National Banking Act. Through this act, the OCC ruled that a national
bank, or its branch that is located in a place with a population of 5,000 or less, may sell
insurance to existing and potential customers, located anywhere. In 1990, the OCC
permitted banks to sell fixed rate annuities.
Under the new law (GLBA), insurance remains a state-regulated business (the
McCarran-Ferguson Act remains in place). The GLBA repeals sections of the Banking
Act of 1933, including sections 20 and 32, which prohibit national banks from
maintaining securities firms and bank officials from sitting on corporate boards of
insurance companies. It also amends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and creates
a new entity known as a Financial Holding Company (FHC). The FHC is the centerpiece
of this financial modernization. FHCs may engage in activities that are financial in nature
including banking, securities, insurance (underwriting as well as sales as an agent), and
merchant banking. To qualify as an FHC each subsidiary has to be well managed and
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well capitalized. In addition, the depository subsidiary of the FHCs has to comply with
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating requirement.
The GLBA also creates a new type of subsidiary, known as a ‘financial
subsidiary,’ through which banks can conduct many of the same activities as that of a
subsidiary of an FHC7. A significant exception is that insurance underwriting may not be
conducted in a financial subsidiary. However, to own such a financial subsidiary, the
GLBA requires that the bank and each of its depository subsidiaries be well managed and
well capitalized.
The GLBA also repeals Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Act, which stated that
the sale or underwriting of insurance is “not closely related” to banking, effectively
preventing bank holding companies from selling and underwriting insurance. The GLBA
also preempts anti-affiliation laws. Any attempt by a state to deny a depository institution
from trying to affiliate with an insurer can also be nullified since states are forbidden
from discriminating against such entities. Hence, the GLBA allows cross-industry
mergers that were not previously allowed under the OCC rulings.

3.4
3.4.1

Hypothesis and Methodology

Hypotheses
We examine five hypothesis related to the effect of the passage of the GLBA on

the insurance industry.
Hypothesis 1 (Barriers): The relaxation of merger barriers will benefit firms.
The GLBA creates a unique opportunity for cross-industry mergers within the
financial services industry. Prior to the GLBA banks were allowed under OCC regulation
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to enter the insurance business, but mergers between banks and insurance companies
were prohibited. We argue that the GLBA creates economies of scope for firms in the
insurance industry by abolishing the merger barrier. Previous studies find a positive
wealth effect for insurance firms on the announcement of the Citicorp and Travelers
merger. It may be interpreted that this reaction is in anticipation that the regulators would
allow more of such mergers in the future.
Hypothesis 2 (Suitability): More suitable merger targets such as life and
property/casualty insurance will benefit more.
Previous studies hypothesize that banks will be interested in merging with firms
that sell actuarial products, which can be easily marketed with traditional banking
products and may help them to reduce their operating expenses. They further argue that
only a few large banks may choose to underwrite the full line of risk. Prior research
suggests that banks will be more interested in life insurance, because greater synergistic
gains are available for combinations of banks and life insurers than from combinations of
banks and property/casualty insurers.

Other studies argue that the cross-marketing

benefits with traditional banking products makes property/casualty insurers more suitable
as merger targets. In light of this literature we hypothesize that life and/or property
insurance will benefit more from deregulation.
Hypothesis 3 (Size): Larger firms have more resources to take advantage of
merger opportunities, therefore will benefit more.
The GLBA’s biggest innovation is the FHC. It allows institutions to offer an array
of services (banking, insurance and brokerage) under one roof. Larger institutions have
7

Broome and Markham, 2001.
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more resources to exploit this opportunity for scope economies created by the GLBA.
Furthermore, larger firms in the insurance industry are somewhat insulated from takeover
pressure from other sectors that we examine. For example, Carow (2001b) investigates
the impact of OCC rulings that let banks into the insurance business and finds that
following the enacting of Section 92 regulation, larger insurance companies had higher
gains. Thus we expect that larger insurance companies will have a greater wealth effect.
Hypothesis 4 (Performance): Poorly performing firms are more attractive
merger targets, therefore having higher wealth effects.
Two general findings from the merger literature support the argument that poorly
performing firms in the insurance industry will gain from the GLBA. First, the literature
that investigates the relationship between insolvency and mergers in the insurance
industry find that insolvency is a major motivation on the part of target firms to go into
the merger. Thus we expect that the cross-industry merger opportunities created under
the new regulation will be regarded as good news for the poorly performing firms in the
insurance industry. Secondly, prior researchers in the merger literature find evidence that
better performing firms typically takeover poorly performing firms.

The general

consensus from the merger literature is that target firms’ shares sell at a premium as a
result of merger announcements. So we expect that the GLBA will create wealth effects
for the poorly performing firms in the insurance industry.
Hypothesis 5 (Risk Reduction): Cross-industry merger opportunities and
regulatory changes will reduce risk to stockholders.
There are several studies that look into the issue of risk that can arise as a result of
combining commercial banks with insurance companies and securities firms. Some of
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these studies suggest that the combination of banking and –insurance firms will reduce
risk while others argue that some adjustments will be necessary to ensure that banks will
not take excessive risks.

The GLBA has preventive measures to ensure that new

financial conglomerates do not take excessive risk or that existing depository institutions
expand their business into non-traditional services in a manner that threatens their
financial health. It also requires the use of market signals to discipline firms that take
excessive risk. Consequently, diversification under the new regulation should not threaten
the health of the firms in the financial services industry and hence, will create wealth
effects.
3.4.2

Portfolio Analysis:
For our portfolio analysis we create three SIC (Standard Industrial Classification)

based portfolios. They are:
1.

Life insurance. (SIC 6311)

2.

Property/Casualty insurance. (SIC 6331)

3.

Other types of insurance. (SIC 6321, 6351 6361)

Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of the firms in the same
industry measured over a common time-period are contemporaneously correlated because
the firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So in events such as regulatory
changes the residuals will not be independently and identically distributed. If there is a
contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances across equations but not correlated
over time, SUR model estimates will be more efficient than Ordinary Least Squares
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(OLS). Thus, in order to test for hypotheses surrounding the events we estimate the
following model using SUR methodology:
3

3

j =1

j =1

K

Rit = αi + αi ' D + ∑ βij Rmt + j −3 + ∑ βij ' DRmt + j −3 + δ i Rrt + κ i Rft + ∑ γ ik Dkt + eit
k =1

(1)

Here, Rit is the return on portfolio i (i = (1, 2, 3), life insurance, property/casualty
insurance and all other insurance) on day t and Rmt is the return on the market index at
day t.8 Dkt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 over the event window of the kth
announcement and zero otherwise, γik is the coefficient of a dummy variable that captures
the impact of the kth event on the ith portfolio. D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. Rft represents the return on a
foreign exchange index on day t, Rrt represents the return on a one-yearT-bill on day t,
and β’i1, β’i2, and β’i3 capture the shift in exposure to systematic risks between the pre-act
and post-act period for portfolio i.
Based on the above model we test two hypotheses. The first statistically tests
whether all of the announcements analyzed in this paper have a non-zero impact on the
insurance industry. Formally this test is:

γ ik = 0∀i, k

(2)

We do not expect that two lines of business in the insurance industry are going to
have the same impact at each of the announcements. We formally test this using the
following hypothesis test.

γ ik = 0∀i

8

(3)

Lagged values of market return are used to overcome the effects of nonsynchronous trading in the sample.
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We modify the above model to estimate the overall gain of each line of business
from the passage of the GLBA and to test for the winners and losers in the insurance
industry from this law.
3

3

j =1

j =1

Rit = α i + α i ' D + ∑ β ij Rmt + j −3 + ∑ β ij ' DRmt + j −3 + δ i Rrt + κ i Rf t + γ i DG + eit

(4)

Here, the coefficient (γi) of the dummy variable DG estimates the overall impact
of the law on each of the portfolios. This estimation allows us to formally test for
evidence that no two lines of business in insurance industry have the same overall impact.
Using the following hypothesis test in conjunction with the point estimation from
equation 4 of overall impact, allows us to test hypothesis 2.

γ i = γ j ∀i, j
3.4.3

(5)

Specification test
We use a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test as suggested by Berndt and Savin (1977), to

determine whether SUR estimates are more efficient than OLS estimates for our portfolio
model.9

This test in principal determines whether the off-diagonal elements of the variance covariance matrix (S)
of error terms are zero or not. Excluding the diagonal elements, there are 1/2m∗(m-1) unknown parameters
in S that can be arranged in a vector, θ. Here m is the number of equations. The null hypothesis is:
H0:θ = 0
This test is based on the following statistic:
m
λ = T [ ∑ log σˆ 2 − log | ∑ˆ |]
9

LR

i −1

i

2
ˆ is the maximum likelihood
here σˆ i is ei′ei / T from the individual least squares regression and ∑

estimator of S. This statistic has a limiting χ2 distribution with 1/2m∗(m-1) degrees of freedom under the
null hypothesis.
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3.5
3.5.1

Data and Event Selection

Firm Selection
We use the SIC classifications from COMPUSTAT to create our portfolios. The

return information for this study comes from the CRSP tapes, while the balance sheet
information comes from COMPUSTAT.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sample.

Total Asset Value
(Millions of $)

Return on Equity

Life Insurance
n = 29
Mean
61767
Median
8816
Minimum
81
Maximum
463696
Mean
9.38
Median
9.72
Minimum
-8.97
Maximum
15.79

Property/Casualty
Insurance
All Other Insurance
n = 77
n = 34
7757
8071
1593
1153
36
16
150632
122237
6.89
11.79
8.83
12.32
-89.34
-10.70
28.03
27.15

We require firms have no missing trading data from August 1998 to March 2000.
In order to match firms from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, we dropped all firms with
exchange code 4 through 10, since CRSP only has return information for firms trading on
the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. We require the firms to have balance sheet
information for both 1998 and 1999. Our final sample has 140 firms; the descriptive
statistics are presented in table 1.
We use returns data for the sample firms from January 1990 to December 2000 to
estimate of our models.10 Longer estimation windows are used for three reasons. First,
Congress has debated the deregulation of the financial services industry at least 3 times in

10

We also estimate all the models presented in this paper using data from January 1998 to December 2000,
as suggested by one of the referees, the major conclusion of the paper remains same.
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the past decade.11 Second, several deregulations took place in the 90’s.12 Finally, other
major macroeconomic events took place during the 90’s that may have had an impact on
the financial services industry. 13
3.5.2

Macroeconomic variables
Data for the two macroeconomic variables that we use in our study is obtained

from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.14 For foreign exchange
data, we use the Major Currencies Index15. The return is calculated using the following
formula:16
Rf t =

Ft - Ft -1
Ft -1

(6)

To be consistent with previous literature we use the one-year T-bills rate as a
proxy for the interest rate. 17 Interest rate returns are computed using the formula,18

The first time in 1995, Rep. Jim Leach introduced the banking modernization bill. The second time, the
financial modernization bill died in congress due to strong opposition from the insurance industry. Finally,
in 1998, the House version of the modernization bill passed but died in the Senate.
12
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) allowed thrifts to branch where the choose in 1992. The Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act sanctioned interstate banking and loosened interstate
branching in 1994. In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that banks can sell annuities and in the same
ruling, the OCC was allowed to grant subsidiary powers to banks. In 1996, the Fed raised the Section 20
revenue cap from 10 percent to 25 percent, and banks were allowed to merge with large securities
companies. Some banks immediately took advantage of that to acquire securities firms. OCC’s ’ First
Union Letter’ further opened national banks insurance power and the Fed eliminated section 20 firewalls in
1997. The three existing firewalls that were eliminated in 1997 were the restriction on interlocks between
the Section 20 subsidiary and its affiliate banks/ thrift, the prohibition on cross-marketing between a bank
and it’s securities affiliate and the exception to prohibition on the purchase or sale of assets between a bank
and its securities affiliate.
13
The U.S. financial industry had been rocked by crises at home, like the LTCM (1998) crisis, and abroad,
for example, the Asian Crisis (1997) or the Russian Crisis (1998).
14
All the information is available online from http://www.federalreserve.gov
15
The major currencies index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar
against a subset of currencies in the broad index that circulate widely outside the country of issue. The
weights are derived from those in the broad index.
16
From Wetmore and Brick (1994), and Choi, Elyasiani and Kopecky (1992).
17
See Kane and Unal (1988), Flannery and James (1984), and Wetmore and Brick (1994).
18
Also from Wetmore and Brick (1994)
11
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Rrt =

Rt − Rt −1
Rt −1

3.5.3

(7)

Event Selection
Binder (1985b) argues that selection of event dates in regulatory events is much

more difficult than standard studies that concern corporate announcements. Thirteen
major events are identified from the Wall Street Journal and Lexis-Nexis wire service.
Table 2 summarizes the important events.
Table 2: Time line of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The
second column 'Event' describes the main event.
Date
Event
11/4/98

1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato lost his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator Gramm
to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98).

1/8/99

2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress.

2/17/99

3. Draft bill was unveiled in the Senate.

4/12/99

4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill.

4/28/99

5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the
Senate.

5/4/99

6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill.

05/06/99 –
Midnight

7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed.

7/1/99

8. House version of the bill was passed.

10/15/99

9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation.

10/22/99

10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA.

11/02/99

11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way
for the votes in both the House and the Senate.

11/4/99

12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57).

11/12/99

13. President Clinton signs the bill into law.
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Table 3: Estimation of Overall impact of the law.
We estimated the following model to test for the overall impact of the law on each industry:
3

3

j =1

j =1

Rit = α i + α i ' D + ∑ β ij Rmt + j −3 + ∑ β ij ' DRmt + j −3 + δ i Rrt + κ i Rf t + γ i DG + eit
Rit is return on portfolio, i(=1,2,3) on day t. Rmt is Return on market index at time t. αi is the intercept
coefficient for portfolio i. βi1-βi3 are market risk coefficient for portfolio i. β’i1-β’i3 captures the difference
in the exposure to systematic market risk between pre-act and post-act for portfolio i, δi is foreign exchange
risk coefficient for portfolio i and κi is the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. Dkt is a dummy
variable which is equal to 1 on the event windows and zero otherwise, while D is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. eit are the random disturbances. In this
model coefficient of DG s i.e., γi estimates the overall average abnormal return of the law for the ith
portfolio.
Property/Casualty
Insurance
Life Insurance
All other Insurance
Parameter
Estimate
t-stat
Estimate
t-stat
Estimate
t-stat

α
-0.001
-0.306
0.006 **
2.067
α′
0.001
1.328
0.002 ***
4.076
β1
-0.024
-1.021
0.022
1.208
β2
0.010 ***
4.156
0.083 ***
4.572
β3
1.057 ***
44.602
0.796 ***
43.841
β′1
0.001
0.027 -0.119 ***
-3.382
β′2
-0.213 ***
-4.663 -0.339 ***
-9.699
β′3
-0.486 ***
-10.615 -0.204 ***
-5.827
γ
0.004 **
2.218
0.006 ***
4.237
δ
0.000
0.417 -0.001 **
-2.444
κ
0.000
-0.296
0.000
0.933
R2
0.451
0.474
N
38
89
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

0.005
0.001 *

1.329
1.690

-0.031
0.147 ***
0.766 ***
-0.063
-0.257 ***
-0.306 ***
0.003 *
0.000
0.000

-1.295
6.049
31.576
-1.349
-5.494
-6.532
1.660
-1.178
-0.599

0.307
42

Table 4: Test that no two industries have same overall impact from the law.
Column 2 of this table presents the Wald test that two industries have same overall impact from the law.
The underlying distribution is a χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom.
Hypothesis
Overall Impact of the law is same for Life and
Property/Casualty Industry
Overall Impact of the law is same for Life and all
other Industry
Overall Impact of the law is same for Property/Casualty and all
other Industry
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

χ2(2)
17.950***
6.516**
18.033***
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3.6
3.6.1

Empirical Results

Overall impact of the law
Table 3 presents the results from estimation of the overall impact of the law

(average impact of the law over the 13 event windows). Property/casualty has an average
abnormal return (AR)19 of 0.6% (significant at 1% level) compared to that of 0.4%
(significant at 5% level) for life insurance. The portfolio of all other insurance firms has
an average abnormal return of 0.3% (significant at 10%). We also perform a chi-squared
test (equation 5) to determine if the point estimates of average returns of any two
industries are the same. These results are given in Table 4. The first null hypothesis that
overall impact of the law is the same for the life and property/casualty insurance
industries is rejected at the 1% level. The results also indicate that the impact of the law
is significantly different across the life insurance and all other insurance industries (at the
5% level), as well as across the property/casualty industry and all other insurance
industries (at the 1% level). These results lend support to our second hypothesis.20
3.6.2

Specification Test
The result of the specification test for our portfolio model shows that the null

hypothesis H:θ =0 is rejected at the 1% level. This means that the variance-covariance
matrix is non-diagonal. Statistically that means that SUR is the correct model to choose
as opposed to the OLS.

19

We call it average abnormal return because it is cumulative abnormal return over 13 events over the
number of days in the event window (e.g., a 3 day event window over 13 events is the cumulative abnormal
return over 39 days). We also estimate this model for 2 day [-1,0] event window and the results remain
similar.
20
We also estimate the same model using data from January 1998 to December 2000 and perform the same
χ2 test based on the estimation and reach the same conclusion.
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3.6.3

Hypotheses based on portfolio analysis
The main advantage of using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression methodology is

the ability to do joint hypothesis testing. The following hypothesis tests are based on the
estimation of the portfolio model (presented in Table 5). Here we will test two different
hypotheses.
First we test that all 13 events have zero impact on the insurance industry. This
test is based on equation 2. This hypothesis examines all events to determine whether the
average abnormal returns (all 39) are jointly equal to zero. The distribution under the null
hypothesis is χ2(39). The hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level (calculated value is 85.1).
Panel A of Table 5 presents the SUR estimation results, average abnormal returns
and corresponding t-statistics for each of the 13 events for the three portfolios. It also
presents model parameter estimates for the market betas (current and lagged), shift in
market betas, foreign exchange risk coefficient (δ) and interest rate risk coefficient (κ).
We find that current and lagged market betas are positive and significant at the 1% level
for all three portfolios. The foreign exchange risk coefficient is significant for
property/casualty insurance. Coefficient of β’3 (the risk shift parameter) is negative and
significant (at the 1% level) for all lines of insurance business. This implies that exposure
to systematic risk was reduced after the enactment of GLBA. As discussed earlier this
shift may have arised from the diversification benefits, from safeguards against excessive
risk taking, or due to a combination of both these effects. Panel B presents the results of
the hypothesis test that all the portfolios have the same impact due to an announcement.
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Table 5: Estimation of a modified market model with 3 sub-portfolios of the insurance
industry and test of hypothesis that two lines of business is going to have similar impact
on the same announcements.
The following table presents the estimation results of portfolio model:
3

3

K

j =1

j =1

k =1

Rit = α i + α i ' D + ∑ β ij Rmt + j − 3 + ∑ β ij ' DRmt + j −3 + δ i Rrt + κ i Rft + ∑ γ ik Dkt + eit i={1,2,3}

Rit is return on portfolio, i on day t. Rmt is Return on market index at time t. αi is the intercept coefficient
for portfolio i. βi1-βi3 are market risk coefficients for portfolio i. β’i1-β’i3 captures the difference in the
exposure to systematic market risk between pre-act and post-act for portfolio i, , δi is foreign exchange risk
coefficient for portfolio i and κi is the interest rate risk coefficient for portfolio i. Dkt is a dummy variable
which is equal to 1 in the event window of kth announcement and zero otherwise, while D is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. eit are the random
disturbances. In this model the coefficient of Dkt s i.e. γs estimates the AR over the event window. Panel A
presents the average abnormal return and t-statistics for each of the thirteen events, as well as the model
parameter estimates for the market betas (current and lag), foreign exchange risk coefficient and interest
rate risk coefficient. Panel B presents the results of hypothesis that two lines of business have same impact
on the same announcements. N represents the number of firms in each of the portfolios.
Panel A
Life Insurance

Property/Casualty
Insurance

Panel B
Wald test

All other Insurance
Parameter Estimate
t-stat Estimate
t-stat Estimate
t-stat
χ2(3)
-0.001
-0.323
0.006
2.098
0.005
1.384
α
0.001
1.333
0.002 *** 4.113
0.001 *
1.725
α′
-0.021
-0.879
0.026
1.428 -0.032
-1.301
β1
0.104 *** 4.379
0.086 *** 4.702
0.149 *** 6.104
β2
1.055 *** 44.681
0.795 *** 43.899
0.766 *** 31.580
β3
β′1
-0.002
-0.045 -0.123 *** -3.507 -0.063
-1.344
-0.218 *** -4.796 -0.342 *** -9.797 -0.258 *** -5.536
β′2
-0.484 *** -10.632 -0.204 *** -5.827 -0.305 *** -6.538
β′3
0.000
0.443
0.001 *** -2.465
0.000
-1.231
δ
0.000
-0.336
0.000
0.885
0.000
-0.616
κ
-0.002
-0.374
0.000
-0.079
0.007
1.142 1.712
γ1
γ2
0.000
-0.061 -0.002
-0.586 -0.014 ** -2.468 6.266 *
0.022 *** 3.982
0.011 *** 2.671
0.005
0.950 16.384 ***
γ3
γ4
0.000
0.050 -0.001
-0.202
0.006
1.114 1.620
-0.007
-1.252
0.010 **
2.349
0.010
1.717 14.916 ***
γ5
-0.001
-0.145
0.008
1.529
0.004
0.565 3.526
γ6
0.002
0.325
0.012 **
2.321
0.002
0.278 6.644 *
γ7
0.008
1.224
0.000
-0.050
0.000
0.015 2.124
γ8
0.008
1.492
0.004
0.840
0.000
-0.029 2.361
γ9
0.013 **
2.431
0.012 *** 2.749
0.009
1.642 9.530 **
γ10
γ11
-0.010
-1.496 -0.001
-0.167
0.004
0.637 3.336
0.012 *
1.770
0.018 *** 3.497 -0.002
-0.286 14.514 ***
γ12
γ13
-0.005
-0.525
0.006
0.856
0.008
0.837 2.382
R2
0.456
0.479
0.311
N
38
89
42
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Three events produce significant average abnormal returns (AR) for the life
insurance industry. When the draft bill is unveiled in Senate on February 17, 1999, life
insurance has an AR return of 2.2% (significant at the 1% level). When Senator Phill
Gramm (Chairman of Senate Banking Committee) agreed with the White House on the
CRA provision on October 22, 1999, the AR is 1.3% and it is significant at the 5% level.
Finally, when the Senate and House pass the bill, the life insurance portfolio has a
positive AR of 1.2%, significant at the 10% level.
The property/casualty insurance industry has significant stock price reactions on
the same events as that of life insurance. When the draft bill is unveiled, the portfolio of
life insurance firms has an AR of 1.1% (significant at 1%), when Senator Gramm agrees
with the White House on CRA provision the AR is 1.2% (significant at 1%) and when the
Senate and House pass the bill it has a 1.8% AR (significant at 1%). In addition, the
property/casualty insurance industry has a significant stock market reaction on two other
occasions. The first of these is when the Senate Banking Committee formally files the
Financial Services Modernization Bill to the Senate. On this occasion, the
property/casualty portfolio has a 1.0% AR, significant at the 5% level. This insurance
portfolio also has a 1.2% AR (significant at 5%) when the Senate passed Senate version
of the bill (S. 900).
The portfolio of other insurance firms has a negative reaction on one event. This
is when the Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in the Congress. The AR in
this occasion is -1.4% (significant at the 5% level).
Panel B of Table 5 presents the Wald test of the hypothesis presented by equation
3 for each announcement. This tests the hypothesis that the information produced during
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the kth event has the same impact over all three portfolios. We find that over six different
events the impact of the announcement has an asymmetric impact across the three
portfolios. They are events 2 (Financial Services Bill was re-introduced in Congress), 3
(Draft Bill is unveiled in Senate.), 5 (Senate banking committee formally files the bill.), 7
(Senate passes S. 900 (Senate version of the Bill)), 10 (Senator Gramm makes a
compromise with The White House on the CRA.) and 12 (Senate and House pass the
bill).

3.7

Cross Sectional Analysis

The GLBA creates positive and significant wealth effects for some firms and
negative but significant effects for others. Other firms may have statistically insignificant
wealth effects from the passage of the GLBA. The general purpose of a cross-sectional
analysis is to identify firm-specific characteristics that will help us to single out winners
and losers from this law. Specifically, our goal is to test for hypothesis 3, 4 and 5.
In order to identify the firm-specific characteristics, we first need to generate the
overall AR for each firm. We use equation 4 to generate the wealth effects (i.e. γI for firm
i gives the right hand side variable).
ARi = θ + θ LIFE LIFE + θ OTHERS OTHERS +

+θ SIZE SIZE + θ SIZExLIFE ( SIZExLIFE ) + θ SIZExOTHERS ( SIZExOTHERS )
+θ ROE ROE + θ ROExLIFE ( ROExLIFE ) + θ ROExOTHERS ( ROExOTHERS )

(8)

+θ RISK RISK + θ RISKxLIFE ( RISKxLIFE ) + θ RISKxOTHERS ( RISKxOTHERS ) + ξ

Here θ is the intercept for property/casualty insurance firms, the difference in
coefficient estimate of intercept for life insurance firms with property/casualty insurance
firms is θLIFE and the difference in coefficient estimate of intercept for other insurance
firms with property/casualty insurance firms is θOTHERS. The Size variable is calculated by
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taking the log of book value of total assets. ROE is a profitability indicator, defined as net
income after taxes as a percent of book value of equity capital. RISK is the change in
exposure to systematic risk, which we estimate using equation 4 (β’i3). θSIZE is the
coefficient estimate of size for property/casualty insurance, while θSIZExLIFE is the
difference in coefficient estimate of size variable for life insurance firms with
property/casualty insurance and θSIZExOTHERS is the difference in coefficient estimate of
size variable for other insurance firms with property/casualty insurance. The coefficient
estimates for ROE and SHIFT are defined likewise.
We estimate equation 8 using the OLS method. The result of the estimation is
presented in table 6; the t-statistics are computed using the formulas suggested by
MacKinnon and White (1985). We expect SIZE variable to be positive and significant.
Coefficient for SIZE variable of the reference group (property/casualty insurance) is
positive and significant at 1% level. While the difference in coefficient estimates of the
size variable for life insurance firms and other insurance firms from the reference group
is insignificantly different from zero. Thus we find that, consistent with the hypothesis,
larger firms in the insurance industry, irrespective of the business line, gain from the
GLBA.
Prior merger literature concludes that poorly performing firms become merger
targets. Previous researcher also predict that banking firms may benefit from mergers
with life and property/casualty insurance. Thus we expect that poorly performing firms,
especially the ones in the life and property/casualty insurance business will benefit more.
The results in Table 6 show that the coefficient estimate of ROE for the reference group
is negative and significant and the difference in the coefficient estimate for life insurance
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is insignificantly different from zero. These results are consistent with the hypothesis.
But we find that the difference in the coefficient estimate for other insurance firms is
positive and significant.
Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of wealth effect on each firm in the insurance industry.
The models are:
ARi = θ + θ LIFE LIFE + θ OTHERS OTHERS +

+θ SIZE SIZE + θ SIZExLIFE ( SIZExLIFE ) + θ SIZExOTHERS ( SIZExOTHERS )
+θ ROE ROE + θ ROExLIFE ( ROExLIFE ) + θ ROExOTHERS ( ROExOTHERS )
+θ RISK RISK + θ RISKxLIFE ( RISKxLIFE ) + θ RISKxOTHERS ( RISKxOTHERS ) + ξ

Both models are estimated using OLS. Here ARi is the abnormal return of firm i. ξ is the error term in the
regression. θ is the intercept for property/casualty insurance firms, the difference in coefficient estimate of
intercept for life insurance firms with property/casualty insurance firms is θLIFE and for other insurance
firms with property/casualty insurance firms is θOTHERS. SIZE variable is calculated by taking book value of
total asset. ROE is a profitability indicator, defined as net income after taxes as a percent of book value of
equity capital. RISK is the change in exposure to systematic risk, which we estimate using equation 4 (β’i3).
θSIZE is the coefficient estimate of SIZE for property/casualty insurance, while θSIZExLIFE is the difference in
coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for life insurance firms with property/casualty insurance and
θSIZExOTHERS is the difference in coefficient estimate of SIZE variable for other insurance firms with
property/casualty insurance. The coefficient estimates for ROE and SHIFT are defined likewise.
Parameter
Estimate
t-statistic
-0.288 **
-2.587
θ
0.204
0.997
θLIFE
0.130
0.829
θOTHERS
0.046 ***
3.563
θSIZE
-0.026
-1.202
θSIZE x LIFE
-0.026
-1.333
θSIZE x OTHERS
-0.003 ***
-4.485
θROE
0.009
1.117
θROE x LIFE
0.009 ***
4.441
θROE x OTHERS
-0.177 **
-2.252
θRISK
0.471 **
2.356
θ RISK x LIFE
0.073
0.545
θ RISK x OTHERS
R2
F

0.355
6.209 ***

***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

We expect that the merger opportunities will create diversification benefits that
will reduce the exposure to market risk for the firms in the insurance industry. In
addition, the GLBA also reduces risk by providing safeguards against excessive risk-
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taking. For both these reasons, we expect that risk reduction will account for a part of the
wealth effect. We find that for the reference group the coefficient estimate for risk is
negative and significant but for firms in the life insurance the difference in coefficient
estimate is positive and significant. For all other insurance firms the difference in
estimate is insignificant. So shareholders of property/casualty insurance as well as other
insurance firms (except life insurance firms) benefit from the diversification and new
measures included in GLBA which safeguards against excessive risk-taking.

3.8

Conclusion

In this paper, we examine the impact of Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999 on the insurance industry. Our sample includes 140 firms from the insurance
industry. We analyze 13 different announcement dates that were related to the passage of
the GLBA. We study several different issues including characterizing the winners and
losers from the passage of this law at both the industry level and the firm level.
This study has two major contributions. First, previous studies consistently find
that the GLBA creates wealth effects for the insurance industry, but none of these studies
investigate whether some lines of business within the insurance industry may benefit
more than others. We find that property/casualty and life insurance firms gain more from
the deregulation compared to other firms in the insurance business. We also show that
this gain can be explained by their suitability as targets to banking conglomerates.
Secondly, we show that diversification opportunities and safeguards against excessive
risk-taking under the GLBA reduces exposure to systematic risk for all business lines in
the insurance industry and creates value for the shareholders of property/casualty firms
and the portfolio of other firms (except life insurance firms).
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In addition we also test a merger related hypothesis. We find strong evidence that
large firms, irrespective of business lines, gain from the passage of this law. We also find
that poorly performing firms in both the property/casualty and life insurance industries
gain from the deregulation.

3.9
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Chapter IV
Implications of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act for
International Banking
4.1

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA) on international banks. We find that the banking sectors of most developed
countries have significant negative spillover effects from the GLBA. We also find that
the impact of the GLBA on any two countries’ banking sectors is not the same. Most
importantly we show that exposure to systematic risk with respect to world equity index
has increased following the passage of the GLBA and this can explain the cross-sectional
variation of the wealth effects. This result implies that the GLBA reduced diversification
opportunities for foreign banks by restricting their operations in the U.S., the most
important banking market. In cross-sectional analysis we also find, consistent with
previous literature, that wealth effect can be partially explained by country-specific
dummy variables.

4.2

Introduction

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 is potentially the most significant
legislation of the past century because it changes the way financial institutions conduct
their business in the U.S. However, predictions have been made, in the academic and
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professional literature, that the GLBA will have a widespread impact on international
banking as well. Some argue that the GLBA will induce more cross-country mergers
while others argue that the GLBA will create growth opportunities for international banks
in the U.S. In a recent study, Carow and Heron (2002) analyze the impact of this
regulation on ten publicly traded international banks in the U.S. They find that the return
on a portfolio of international banks trading in the U.S.A is more negative compared to
that of publicly traded U.S. banks following the passage of the GLBA. Our study
complements that of Carow and Heron (2002) and broadens it to investigate the impact of
the GLBA on 215 international banks from 10 developed countries. We also seek to
answer whether the GLBA has created any diversification opportunities for international
banks. Finally, we try to predict whether the GLBA will encourage increases in foreign
bank presence, growth and entry in the United States.
This study focuses on three important questions; first, does the GLBA create
growth opportunities for foreign banks in the U.S. It is argued in the literature that this act
creates significant growth opportunities for international banks and there is a growing
trend of non-U.S. banks acquiring U.S. banks. Berger et al. (2000) document a trend in
acquisitions of U.S. firms by non-U.S. firms. By the mid-90s the total value of these
consolidations was $10 billion and by 1998, more than $12 billion. Historically, any
increase in the activity of foreign banks in the U.S. has created political pressure on
regulators to restrict their growth. For example, Goldberg and Saunders (1981) notes that
rapid growth in foreign banks in the U.S. in the early 70s led to the restriction of multistate operations of all foreign banks and subsequently led to the International Banking
Act of 1978. The second question we address is whether the impact on foreign banks
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varies across countries, bank size, profitability and presence in the U.S. We investigate
this question because literature on foreign bank activity in the U.S. predicts that the
impact of the GLBA will be different from one country to the other and the literature that
investigate the impact of the GLBA on domestic banks find that size and profitability can
explain the cross-sectional variation of the wealth effect.
Finally, we investigate if the GLBA creates diversification opportunities for
international banks and thereby reduces exposure to systematic risk. Correlations of bank
earnings presented in Table 1 show very strong diversification opportunities for
international banks in the U.S., as argued by Berger et al. (2000). We inquire whether the
GLBA allows international banks to take advantage of this opportunity as suggested by
Finch, Macdonald and Walker (2000) and thereby reduce the exposure to systematic risk.

1.000
-0.426
-0.336

USA

1.000
-0.138
-0.431
-0.702

UK

1.000
0.088
0.301
-0.708
-0.603
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Canada
1.000
Denmark
0.648
1.000
France
-0.344 -0.229
1.000
Germany
0.129
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1.000
Greece
-0.705 -0.279
0.084
0.394
1.000
Italy
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1.000
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-0.320 -0.563
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0.733
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0.782 -0.522
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0.155
0.107
0.309
0.310
UK
0.592
0.689 -0.734
0.446 -0.169 -0.854
USA
0.413
0.399 -0.880
0.258 -0.329 -0.938
Source: ‘Bank Profitability’: OECD Publications 1999 and 2000.
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Table 1: Correlation of bank earnings between USA and selected G-10 and EU countries
between 1988 and 1997.
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Our study concentrates on large international banks because the literature on
international spillover effect predicts that larger banks are affected from international
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events. In this study we analyze 215 foreign banks from 10 countries, of which are 7 are
EU member countries (France, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK) and
3 are non-EU countries (Canada, Japan and Switzerland). We have also included 45 large
U.S. banks in this study. We find that most of the foreign banking industries have a
significant impact from the events leading to the passage of the GLBA. Banking
industries of 6 (Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Japan, and Spain) out of the 10
countries that we investigate have a significantly negative impact, while the banking
industries of France, Italy and the UK are largely unaffected by this regulation. We find
that the cross-sectional variation in firm specific wealth effect is partly attributable to
country specific events and attributes during that period.
The most important contribution of this paper is that we identify that the GLBA
has increased international banks’ exposure to systematic risk, with respect to a world
index. The GLBA has reduced the capability of international banks to diversify their
portfolio by restricting their entry and expansion to the U.S. market.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: the second section provides a
literature review. Section three briefly discusses the GLBA and its implication for
international banks. Section four introduces our major hypotheses. Section five describes
the methodology, data and lists the major events. Section six presents the empirical
results and a final section concludes.

4.3
4.3.1

Literature

Literature on the impact of GLBA on domestic Financial Institutions
Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) investigate the market response of the

GLBA on the three major financial industries. They do not find any market response for
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commercial banks, while they find a significantly positive wealth effect for both the
insurance and brokerage industries, though only for one event. They argue that loopholes
in the laws have long allowed banks to have a ‘fairly substantial presence in other
sectors’ as a reason to why there is no wealth effect for commercial banks. For all three
industries they find that the size of the firms can explain the cross-sectional variation of
the wealth effect and for commercial banks they also find that profitability can explain
the cross-sectional variation in return. Similarly, Carow and Heron (2002) find that
brokerage firms and insurance companies benefit from the GLBA, but banks do not
benefit. They also find negative returns for foreign banks, thrifts, and finance companies;
though larger non-depository firms have higher returns. Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), on
the other hand, find that all three industries benefit from the provisions of GLBA and that
larger and well-capitalized banks benefit more from this law. They also find that
brokerage firms benefit regardless of size, but the gains are inversely related to capital
position, and insurance companies benefit regardless of size and capitalization. Barth,
Brumbaugh, and Wilcox (2000) argue that the GLBA is just ratifying the "Status-quo”
rather than being revolutionary, and that this law is more in favor of larger banks and
financial institutions.
4.3.2

Literature on international spillover effects
There is evidence in the literature of international spillover effects that predict that

the impact of the GLBA will not be limited to the U.S. financial services industry. Bruner
and Simms (1987) examine the reaction of U.S. banks to Mexico’s loan crisis and find
that U.S. banks have negative wealth effect to the news. Musumerci and Sinkey (1990)
find that Brazil’s announcement of a debt moratorium in 1987 had a negative impact on
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the U.S. money center banks. Madura, Whyte and McDaniel (1991) find that Citicorp’s
announcement of a significant increase in loan-loss reserves in 1987 had a significantly
negative impact on British banks. In all of the above cases the exposure of banks to less
developed countries are identified as the reason for the negative reactions.
4.3.3

Cross boarder consolidation and risk expected return tradeoffs
The available empirical research suggests that at least some types of cross-border

consolidation can improve the risk-expected return tradeoff. The literature on commercial
banks in the U.S. generally find that larger, more geographically diversified institutions
tend to have better risk-expected return tradeoffs (e.g. Macllister and McManus (1993),
Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 1999), Hughes and Mester (1998) and Demsetz
and Strahan (1997)), while Cummins and Weiss (2000) find that international
diversification can improve both the risk-expected return tradeoff and profit efficiency
for the insurance industry.
4.3.4

Literature on the determinants of foreign bank presence, activity and growth
Grosse and Goldberg (1991) investigate the foreign banking activity in the United

States by country of origin. Their results show that foreign investment (FDI and foreign
portfolio investment) into the United States, bilateral trade, and the size of each
countries’ banking sector (demand deposits and time deposits) are positively correlated
with that countries’ bank presence in the U.S. Hultman and McGee (1989) find that
foreign presence of U.S. bank subsidiaries are directly related to FDI and exchange rate,
and inversely related to P/E ratios. They find the growth of foreign bank branches and
agencies in the U.S. is directly related to FDI, exchange rate and the passage of
International Banking Act (IBA) of 1978. Goldberg and Saunders (1981) show that
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important determinants in foreign banks’ growth in the U.S. are the size of interest
differentials between U.S. and foreign deposits and loans, the falling P/E ratio for U.S.
bank stocks, increased size of FDI, the persistent depreciation in the dollar and the
expectation that the IBA of 1978 would have a restrictive effect on foreign banking
activity in the U.S. Seth et al. (1998) show that one of the major determinants of financial
institutions’ growth abroad has been the parallel growth of foreign direct investment and
foreign trade by globally oriented multinational corporations from the institutions’ home
country.

4.4

GLBA and the International Banks1

Under the GLBA, international banks can engage in commercial banking,
merchant banking and insurance in ways consistent with their business strategies. If the
international bank becomes a Financial Holding Company (FHC) there is no limit to the
revenue generated by its insurance activity, merchant banking activity or investment
banking activity. To qualify as a FHC, it must notify the Federal Reserve about the
activities in which it will engage and make certain required certifications of those
activities. In order to become a FHC, its depository institution must be well capitalized
and well managed; and no insured institutions within the FHC can have less than a
satisfactory rating under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).
International banks have to decide whether they want to keep their current
structure and continue to engage in current activities or to engage in other activities
permitted under the new regulation. If international banks engage in traditional
commercial banking in the U.S., via a branch or agency, they may still do so without

1

Adapted from Finch, Macdonald and Walker (2000)
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changing their structure. But if the U.S. branch or agency engages in certain securities,
merchant banking or investment banking activities in the U.S., the operation has to cease
(unless they are grandfathered2). Under the new regulation the activity, and not the entity,
determines the primary supervisory authority.
Most international banks that engaged in significant insurance activities did so
through a domestic bank or through an insurance subsidiary of a domestic bank. Now
international banks must either operate via an existing licensed insurance subsidiary, or
establish a new subsidiary and obtain a license from the state insurance department where
they want to sell the insurance, to take full advantage of the opportunity provided by the
new regulation.
Most of the international banks carry out their investment or merchant banking
activities in U.S. through Section 20 investment subsidiaries. These banks can continue to
engage in these activities so long as they are grandfathered, but they cannot engage in any
new activities. Some of the international banks in the U.S. engage in investment banking
through domestic bank and trust companies. These operations must cease under the new
law. The GLBA requires international banks to engage in these activities through a U.S.
registered broker dealer.
In order to engage in any activity in the U.S., an international bank must be well
capitalized and well managed by the standards set by the FED. The FED will review
worldwide operations of an international bank to determine whether they can engage in
commercial banking, or any other activities in the U.S.

2

Grandfathered means the bank may continue to engage in the activity because it did so before the
restrictions became law. New activities are not covered by the grandfather provision.
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4.5

Hypotheses

We test the following four major hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: GLBA will have significant spillover effects on international
banks.
We expect that banks in developed countries will have significant wealth effects
due to the passage of the GLBA for three reasons. First, the literature on international
spillover effects predicts that if the banking sector of a country has exposure to any
foreign market, then an event in that foreign market can have spillover effects on the
financial sector of that country. Any bank that wants to have international coverage has to
have its operation in the U.S.3.
Table 2: Foreign Banks’ Operation in U.S.: No of Banks, Revenue from U.S. Operation
and FHC status of Foreign Banks
No of
Banks in
USA in
(9/98)

No of Total Asset
Banks in Booked in
USA in U.S. (9/98)
Country
(9/99)
$million
Canada
6
6
122,524
Denmark
2
2
France
14
10
171,358
Greece
1
1
Germany
14
15
147,458
Italy
17
15
31,013
Japan
50
39
279,591
Spain
5
5
17,651
Switzerland
8
8
83,336
UK
11
10
83,540
All foreign Banks
320
284
1,162,669
Source: Board of Governors Federal Reserve System.

3

Total Asset
No. of Banks
Percentage of
Booked in claimed FHC status foreign Banks
U.S. (9/99) by November 30, claiming FHC
$million
2001
structure
125,095
6
100%
1
50%
163,618
2
14%
0
0%
209,228
2
14%
26,355
0
0%
213,625
0
0%
20,319
1
20%
56,120
2
25%
88,551
1
9%
1,126,516
21
7%

Blanden (2000) claims that the “U.S. remains a magnet for foreign banks, with a presence in New York
essential for any group with pretensions to international coverage”.
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Table 2 shows that all of the developed countries (included in this study) have
exposure to the U.S. banking market. So we expect a spillover effect on the international
banks from the GLBA.
Second, it is documented in the literature (Goldberg and Saunders (1981) and
Hultman and McGee (1989)) that the IBA of 1978 influenced the growth of foreign banks
in the U.S. Similarly, we argue that the GLBA may also impact the growth of foreign
banks in the U.S.
Third, Berger et al. (2000) report a growing trend in international banks acquiring
U.S. banks, which reflects the intention of foreign banks to establish their presence in the
U.S. In the mid-90s the total value of such consolidations was $10 billion (in 1998
dollars) and by 1998, that figure had increased to $12 billion. One of the major reasons
for such mergers is that at least some types of cross-border consolidation are likely to
improve the risk-expected return tradeoff. Table 1 shows the correlation of bank earnings
between the U.S. and banks in the countries included in this study from 1988 to 1997.
The correlation of earnings with the U.S. is quite low and mostly negative, except with
the UK. This data suggests very strong diversification possibilities and opportunities to
improve the institutions’ risk-expected return tradeoff through cross-border consolidation
(Berger et al. (2000)). Given the diversification opportunities, added with the size of the
market (of the U.S. banking industry), any major regulatory change in the U.S. banking
industry should have spillover effects on international banks.
Hypothesis 2: The banking industries of any two countries will not have the same
impact from the GLBA.
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Studies that investigate foreign bank presence, activity and growth in the U.S.
find that there are country specific characteristics like exchange rate, size of the source
countries banking sector, P/E ratio and trade with the source country that can explain
such activities. We argue that since such characteristics, and also exposure to the U.S.
banking market, are not same for any two countries, the impact on any two countries’
banking industry will not be the same from the GLBA.
Hypothesis 3: The banking industry of developed countries will have negative
wealth effects from the passage of the GLBA.
The GLBA creates opportunities for international banks to engage in activities
that were not possible under previous regulation. Under the GLBA, international banks
have no revenue limits from any of its investment, merchant banking insurance or
depository activities, when they choose to become a FHC. But these advantages are also
available to local banks, insurance and securities firms. So for all the new opportunities, a
foreign bank still has to compete with local firms who have “home field advantage”4 over
the foreign firms. Thus we expect that international banks may have negative wealth
effects from the passage of GLBA.
Under the new regulation, the insurance activities conducted by foreign banks
through domestic banks and insurance subsidiaries of domestic banks have to cease. In
addition, a portion of the investment and merchant banking activities conducted via
domestic banks and trust companies must also be discontinued. International banks will
be allowed to retain only the part of their investment and merchant banking activity (the
most important operation in the U.S.) carried out through Section 20 investment

4

See Berger et al. (2000) for a detailed discussion of the Home Field Advantage hypothesis.
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subsidiary, and will be restricted to those activities that are grandfathered. The same
grandfathering provision applies to their traditional commercial banking activity. But for
all the activities that are allowed, they will still have to comply the FED’s capitalization
and management standards for their U.S. operations, as well as their worldwide
operations. In fact, the permissible activity of foreign banks will become more restricted
under the GLBA unless foreign banks claim a FHC structure. To claim a FHC structure
foreign banks must meet the FEDs capitalization and management standards for U.S.
operations as well as worldwide operations. The capital adequacy and management
standards set by the GLBA can also be a potential reason for negative wealth effects for
foreign insurance firms. Carow and Heron (2002) argue that many countries impose
lower capital requirements than the U.S., thus these eligibility requirements impose new
costs for foreign banks that want to do business in the United States as a FHC, or in any
other structure.
Hypothesis 4: The GLBA will reduce the diversification opportunities for
international banks and thereby increase risk for their stockholders.
The GLBA will restrict the entry and expansion of international banks in the U.S.
due to increased competition from the domestic participants in the U.S. banking industry
who have home field advantage over the foreign banks. This restricts the scope of
activities permissible to foreign banks, by restructuring the way certain business are
carried out, and finally and most importantly, due to the FED’s capitalization and
management standards for U.S. operations as well as worldwide operations. For all of
these reasons, the GLBA will reduce the opportunities for diversification of foreign banks
in the most important banking market in the world.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Three
bank
Total no of Total no of
Total no of
Total no of No. of FHCs Export from Import to
in
Total Asset in ROE in Agencies Branches Representatives Subsidiaries in
No. of concentrations
11/30/2001ℵ U.S. 99*ℵ U.S. 99*ℵ
Country firms Ratioϕ
1999⊕ in 1999*** in 1999***
1999 ⊕∗
in 1999***
1999***
Canada
8
65.20%
$106,498.89 14.60
3
2
0
1
6 $166,600.00 $198,711.10
Denmark
36
63.70%
$197,443.91 9.12
0
1
0
0
1
$1,725.60 $2,818.70
France
18
63.60%
$69,747.42 12.38
0
3
0
0
2 $18,877.40 $25,708.60
Greece
8
98.30%
$16,701.70 25.57
0
0
0
0
0
$995.50
$563.10
Germany
11
89.50%
$234,317.24 9.66
0
3
0
1
1 $26,800.20 $55,228.40
Italy
17
35.90%
$62,000.18 12.13
0
6
2
0
0 $19,436.60 $8,475.00
Japan
73
28.30% $38,019,876.81 -10.87
1
14
6
0
0 $57,465.70 $130,863.90
Spain
15
50.10%
$40,494.54 16.21
0
0
0
0
0
$6,133.40 $5,059.20
Switzerland
21
79.80%
$57,467.31 8.29
0
2
0
1
2
$8,371.30 $9,538.60
UK
8
29.10%
$243,770.56 21.32
0
4
0
0
1 $38,407.10 $39,237.20
USA
45
13.30%
$66,903.15 1.22**
570
*In millions of U.S. dollars
⊕
Source: DataSream
**Source: Compustat
*** Source: The Banker March 1999
ℵ
Source Board of Governors Federal Reserve System.
ϕ
Barth, Nolle and Rice (2000)
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This reduction in diversification benefits will increase risk for stockholders of
international banks in the developed countries.

4.6
4.6.1

Data and Methodology

Data
This study mainly concentrates on banks from European Union (EU) for several

reasons. First, the U.S. and the EU are frequently compared in the literature because they
have roughly equal shares of world population and GDP. Secondly, the EU accounts for a
larger share of the world’s banking assets compared to that of the USA5. We include
Japan because, until 1999, Japanese banks had the highest total banking assets in the
United States and Japan has the most restricted financial services industry in the
developed world. Canada is included because all of the Canadian Schedule 1 banks have
large operations in the U.S. and Canada has control over a sizeable amount of assets in
U.S. operations.
We test the above hypotheses using daily common stock returns over a period
from January 1998 to December 2000. Daily stock returns and balance sheet information
for large banks from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain,
Switzerland, and the UK are obtained from the DataStream database and BankScope
database. Daily stock returns for 45 large U.S. banks (over $10 billion total assets in
1998) are obtained from the CRSP database.

5

See Barth, Nolle and Rice (2000).
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Table 4: Time line of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The
second column 'Event' describes the main event.
Date
Event
11/4/98
1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato lost his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator Gramm
to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98).
1/8/99

2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress.

2/17/99

3. Draft bill was unveiled in the Senate.

4/12/99

4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill.

4/28/99

5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the
Senate.

5/4/99

6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill.

05/06/99 –
Midnight

7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed.

7/1/99

8. House version of the bill was passed.

10/15/99

9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation.

10/22/99

10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA.

11/02/99

11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way
for the votes in both the House and the Senate.

11/4/99

12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57).

11/12/99

13. President Clinton signs the bill into law.

Table 3 presents the distribution of firms across the countries, some firm specific
information, information regarding bilateral trade with the U.S. and the home country,
form of operation of these banks in the U.S. and concentration of the banking sector in
the respective countries.
We identify 13 major events from the Wall Street Journal and Lexis-Nexis wire
service. In Table 5 we summarize these important events.
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4.6.2

Portfolio Analysis
First, we adapted the model used by Blinder (1985), then following Wagster

(1996) we introduce long-term and short term interest rate to control for the interest rate
risk. We also include return on exchange rate with the U.S. dollar because return on
foreign investment will depend on return on the assets within its own market and changes
in exchange rate. We then modify the model following Cornett and Tehranian (1990) and
introduce the lagged value of the market index for possible nonsynchronous trading
effects. We use dummy variables to identify the major events that led to the passage of
the GLBA. The dummy variable is equal to 1 over each event window and zero
otherwise. The coefficient estimate associated with the dummy variable measures the
impact of the event on the portfolio. The model we estimate is:
2

2

2

2

j =1

j =1

j =1

j =1

Rit = α i + α i ' D + ∑ β mij Rmi ,t + j − 2 + ∑ β mij ' DRmi ,t + j − 2 + ∑ β wij Rwt + j − 2 + ∑ β wij ' DRwt + j − 2

(1)

+δ li Rrli ,t + δ si Rrsi ,t + κ i Rf i ,t + γ i DG + eit
where, Rit is the return on portfolio i (i= 11, each country has one equally weighted
portfolio) at day t, Rmi,t is the return on market index of country i at day t, Rwt is the
return on MSCI world equity index at day t, DG is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
over every event window6 and zero otherwise, γi is the coefficient of a dummy variable
that captures the impact of GLBA on the banking industry of ith country. Rfi,t represents
the return on exchange rate between U.S. dollar and the currency of ith country at day t;
Rrsi,t represents the return on short term interest rate for country i at day t; Rrli,t represents
the return on long term interest rate for country i at day t. D is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise, thus βm’i1-βm’i2
6

Event windows are defined in Table 5.
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captures the change in exposure to systematic risks between pre-act and post-act time for
country i with respect to its own country equity index and βw’i1-βw’i2 captures the change
in exposure to systematic risks between pre-act and post-act time for country i with
respect to its MSCI world equity index.
We estimate the model presented in equation 1 using seemingly unrelated
regression methodology. Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of the firms
in the same industry measured over a common time-period are contemporaneously
correlated because the firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So in events
such as regulatory changes the residuals will not be iid. If there is a contemporaneous
correlation among the disturbances across equations but not correlated over time, SUR
model estimates will be more efficient than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We use a
likelihood ratio (LR) test suggested by Berndt and Savin (1977) to test the null hypothesis
that the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix are zero7. We perform
this test to check for contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances across
equations.
The main advantage of using the SUR is that it allows us to test for the interesting
cross-country restriction (hypothesis 2). In order to test for hypothesis 2 we test the
following null hypothesis:
This test in principal determines whether the off-diagonal elements of the variance covariance matrix (S)
of error terms are zero or not. Excluding the diagonal elements, there are 1/2m∗(m-1) unknown parameters
in S that can be arranged in a vector, θ. Here m is the number of equations. The null hypothesis is:
H0:θ = 0
This test is based on the following statistic:
m
λ = T [ ∑ log σˆ 2 − log | ∑ˆ |]
7

LR

i −1

i

2
ˆ is the maximum likelihood
here σˆ i is ei′ei / T from the individual least squares regression and ∑

estimator of S. This statistic has a limiting χ2 distribution with 1/2m∗(m-1) degrees of freedom under the
null hypothesis.
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H 0 : γ 1 = γ 2 = γ 3 = ..... = γ 11
4.6.3

(2)

Cross Sectional Analysis
In order to test for our fourth hypothesis, we generate average abnormal return,

i.e. γi (i=1 to 215) for each firm using the model presented by equation 1. We then
estimate the following model using OLS, where γi is the dependent variable. The crosssectional model is:

γ i , j = f (can, den, fra, ger , gre, ita, jap, spa, swi, uk , β mi′, j , β wi′, Sizei , ROEi )

(3)

where, can, fra,…… uk are country dummies, which are equal to one if a firm is from that
country, and zero otherwise. These dummies will control for country specific variations.

βm’i,j and βw’i are changes in exposure to systematic risk with respect to a home country
market index and the MSCI world equity index. Sizei is defined as the log of total asset
value (in U.S. dollars) in 1998 for firm i and ROEi is the return on equity of firm i in
1998.

4.7
4.7.1

Empirical Results

Portfolio Analysis
The result of the specification test for our portfolio model shows that the null

hypothesis that off diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix is zero is rejected
at the 1% level. Statistically that means that coefficient estimates from SUR are more
efficient as opposed to the OLS estimates.
Estimates of the parameters of the portfolio model are presented in Table 5. We
find that for most of the countries the own country equity index is significant and positive
(except Spain) while we find that MSCI world equity index is positive and significant for
the U.S. only.
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Table 5: Estimation results of model parameters of the portfolio model (equation 1).
The following table presents the estimation results of portfolio model:
2

2

2

2

j =1

j =1

j =1

j =1

Rit = α i + α i ' D + ∑ β mij Rmi ,t + j − 2 + ∑ β mij ' DRmi ,t + j − 2 + ∑ β wij Rwt + j − 2 + ∑ β wij ' DRwt + j − 2 + δ li Rrli ,t + δ si Rrsi ,t + κ i Rf i,t + γ i DG + eit
where, Rit is the return on portfolio i at day t, Rmi,t is the return on own market index of country i at day t, Rwt is the return on MSCI world equity index at day t, DG is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
over every event window and zero otherwise, Rfi,t represents the return on exchange rate between U.S. dollar and the currency of ith country at day t; Rrsi,t represents the return on short term interest rate
for country i at day t; Rrli,t represents the return on long term interest rate for country i at day t. D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise.
Own Country
Change in the Own
Change in the Own
MSCI World
Change in
Equity index
Own Country
Country Equity index
Country Equity
Equity index
MSCI World
Country
Intercept
the intercept
Equity index
Equity index
(1 day lag)
(1 day lag)
index
(1 day lag)
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Japan
Spain
Switzerland
UK
USA

-126.63
526.89 ***
-1.48
4.36
75.04 ***
77.20 ***
5.72
3.99
63.73 ***
28.00 **
13.39
2.47
31.50
556.67 ***
1.45
14.79
-1140.05 ***
37.75
-31.94
0.35
-222.91 ***
773.24 ***
-7.94
14.37
116.00 ***
-29.43 ***
75.93
-8.16
763.97 ***
197.86 **
17.27
2.14
-196.94 ***
-186.28 ***
-18.27
-8.98
-16605.60 *** 12502.30 ***
-32.02
7.29
-7.47
10.64
-0.98
0.87

0.06
0.12
0.05 *
1.73
0.02 *
1.71
-0.03
-0.28
-0.19
-0.53
0.05
1.12
-0.08 **
-2.34
0.88
1.50
0.13 **
2.34
0.18
0.76
-3453.68 **
-2.31

***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

1.17 **
2.33
0.07 ***
2.76
0.02 *
1.83
0.56 ***
4.73
3.30 ***
9.11
0.30 ***
6.80
0.10 ***
3.13
-0.14
-0.24
0.34 ***
6.29
1.38 ***
5.92
3342.52 **
2.26

0.27
0.47
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.23
0.00
0.03
0.44
0.85
0.01
0.14
0.04
0.87
-1.16
-1.33
-0.01
-0.13
-0.01
-0.02
2066.36
1.05

-0.79
-1.39
-0.04
-0.97
0.00
-0.18
-0.36 **
-2.24
-0.65
-1.25
-0.16 ***
-2.63
-0.02
-0.51
0.52
0.60
0.13
1.38
-0.70 **
-2.03
-6297.22 ***
-3.19

1089.67
1.03
37.48
0.24
-51.97
-0.51
-215.32
-1.02
-231.61
-0.15
3.20
0.01
49.85 *
1.77
-284.09
-0.62
-343.61 ***
-3.61
-2275.14
-0.33
-418.13
-0.33

578.39
0.45
14.60
0.09
34.27
0.30
-107.26
-0.42
1179.73
0.78
147.61
0.32
4.68
0.16
-686.42
-1.23
-112.07
-0.95
2018.44
0.27
12833.00 ***
9.95
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Table 5: Estimation results of model parameters of the portfolio model (equation 1)
continued.

Country
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Japan
Spain
Switzerland
UK
USA

Change in
the MSCI
World
Equity index
(1 day lag)

Change in
the MSCI
World
Equity index

-2514.29
-1115.53
-1.47
-0.56
-105.15
-28.66
-0.42
-0.12
-226.11
-159.42
-1.36
-0.89
-49.47
-93.42
-0.15
-0.23
-61.13
-123.73
-0.02
-0.05
-631.51
-639.23
-0.95
-0.88
-52.68
26.54
-1.13
0.59
359.52
673.63
0.48
0.78
138.42
-61.17
0.90
-0.35
-9792.25 -13370.90
-0.87
-1.10
-3415.17 *
2370.45
-1.71
1.17

Exchange
rate with
U.S.

541.26
0.44
-2.29 *
-1.92
-9.43
-0.13
-331.88
-1.56
677.00
0.51
179.91
0.47
28.73
1.64
-219.80
-0.50
-117.08
-1.41
5.05
0.00
7555.73 ***
4.85

Long-term
Interest rate

169.85
0.38
-50.39
-0.92
-11.52
-0.43
-96.11
-0.72
359.41
0.47
94.57
0.55
-0.41
-0.08
-78.55
-0.25
47.52
1.08
1274.47
0.53
-502.58
-0.64

Shortterm
Interest
rate

-260.16
-0.49
20.89
0.32
-23.00
-0.67
281.69 *
1.80
266.65
0.55
-77.50
-0.41
-0.10
-0.66
-191.26
-0.95
-9.61
-1.01
422.93
0.13
-1276.00
-1.34

Average
return on
13 events

-148.87 ***
-4.01
-17.50 ***
-3.38
-1.27
-0.35
-18.39 **
-2.52
-119.48 **
-2.27
7.00
0.49
-2.77 ***
-2.85
-74.05 ***
-4.61
6.19 *
1.86
-97.75
-0.40
74.14 ***
2.62

R2

0.39
0.75
0.87
0.81
0.96
0.89
0.59
0.44
0.94
0.67
0.42

***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

We find that 7 out of 10 countries we analyze have significant average abnormal
returns from the 13 events that we analyze. Banking industries of six countries have
negative spill over effect from the passage of the GLBA, these are Canadian banking
industry (it has an average abnormal return of –148.87 which is also significant at 1%),
Denmark’s banking industry (it has an average abnormal return of –17.50 significant at
1%), Germany’s banking industry (it has an average abnormal return of –18.39 which is
significant at 5%), Greece’s banking industry (it has an average abnormal return of
119.48 which is also significant at 1%), Japanese banking industry (it has an abnormal

116
return of -2.77 which is significant at 1%), and Spain’s banking industry (it has a
significant abnormal return of –74.05 significant at 1%). The banking industry of
Switzerland has an average abnormal return of 6.19 significant at 10%. The banking
industries of France, Italy and the UK seem to be unaffected by the passage of GLBA.
These results support our first hypothesis that there are significant spillover effects of the
GLBA on banking industries of developed countries and the third hypothesis that these
spillover effects are negative.
Our second hypothesis that the information produced over these 13 events has the
same impact on the banking industry of any two countries is rejected at the 1% level.
This hypothesis is tested using a Wald test (presented by equation 2) with a test statistic
of 76.78. The underlying distribution under the null hypothesis is χ2(10).
4.7.2

Cross Section Analysis
In order to identify the cross sectional variation in average return from the events

that led to the GLBA we perform a cross sectional analysis. We estimate equation 3 using
OLS. The result of the estimation is presented in Table 5; the t-statistics are computed
using the formula suggested by MacKinnon and White (1985). We use country dummy
variables to control for the country specific effects. The variables that are significant may
be due to the country specific variables (like trade with the United States, exchange rate,
size of the source countries financial sector as suggested by the literature on the
determinants of foreign bank presence, activity and growth in the USA) or due to country
specific events in those periods, or the exposure to the U.S. market.
The main hypothesis we want to test is whether GLBA created or reduced the
diversification opportunity for international banks. We find that βw’i,j is positive and
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significant. This means diversification opportunities for these banks, with respect to
world index has been reduced. This complies with our major hypothesis that the GLBA
reduced diversification opportunities for foreign banking companies.
Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of wealth effect on each firm in the banking industries
of selected developed countries.
We estimate the following model:
γ i , j = f (can, den, fra, ger , gre, ita, jap, spa, swi, uk , β mi′, j , β wi′, Sizei , ROEi )
We estimate the model using OLS using 215 firms in the sample. Here γi,j is the abnormal return of firm i
of country j., can, den,….,uk are dummy variables for a particular country, these variables are equal to one
for that country and zero otherwise. βm’i,j is the change in exposure to systematic risk with respect to home
country market index. While βw’i,j is the change in exposure to systematic risk with respect to home
country market index. Size is log of book value of total asset and ROE is return on equity
Parameter Estimate t-statistic P-value
CAN
29.02
1.03 [.305]
DEN
20.77
1.97 [.051]
FRA
27.50
2.67 [.008]
GER
-1.07
-0.06 [.955]
GRE
-58.51
-2.43 [.016]
ITA
21.73
1.69 [.093]
JAP
51.82
2.46 [.015]
SPA
-3.38
-0.17 [.867]
SWI
25.10
2.56 [.011]
UK
54.06
3.00 [.003]
-9.94
-0.79 [.428]
βm’i,j
0.06
3.27 [.001]
βw’i,j
SIZE
-3.41
-1.76 [.080]
ROE
0.01
0.27 [.791]
R2
F-Statistics

0.54
15.36 ***

We use Size and profitability measures in the cross sectional regression because
Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) find that both of these variables can explain the
cross sectional variation in wealth effects for domestic commercial banks from the
passage of the GLBA. For international firms we find evidence that larger firms have
more negative wealth effects. Since larger firms generally would be interested in
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international diversification and have more U.S. exposure, a reduction of such
opportunities should affect them more.

4.8

Conclusion

We examine the impact of the GLBA, a major regulatory change in U.S. financial
services industry, on a sample of 215 non-U.S. banks companies from 10 countries. In the
era of globalization of financial markets it is argued in the literature that deregulation like
the GLBA, or single market program of EU should have an impact beyond the
boundaries of the jurisdiction8. In this paper we present further evidence of globalization
of financial institutions. In our portfolio analysis we find that banking industries of 7 out
of 10 developed countries have significant wealth effects from the passage of the GLBA
(of which only Switzerland has a positive, but insignificant impact), a deregulation that is
designed to deregulate the financial services industry of the United States. We also find
that the impact of the GLBA is not the same for any two banking industries of foreign
countries.
The cross sectional investigation suggests that a part of negative reaction is due to
country specific attributes in that period. But most importantly, we show that the negative
wealth effect is due to the reduction in the diversification opportunities for international
banks that is due to the passage of the GLBA. This reduction in diversification
opportunity from the GLBA can be due to increased competition from domestic
participants, restrictions imposed on the scope of activities permissible to foreign banks,
restructuring the way certain business were carried out, or due to FED’s capitalization
and management standards for its U.S. operation as well as its worldwide operation.
8

Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2000).
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Anecdotal evidence also supports the argument that the GLBA adversely affected the
presence of foreign banks in the U.S. For example, Blanden (2000) reports that the
number of foreign banks in the U.S. has been declining. In addition, Table 2 shows that
only 7% of the foreign banks present in the U.S. have adopted the FHC structure, a
structure through which most of the new opportunities are available to foreign banks.
Finally, we argue that the GLBA will restrict the expansion and entry of international
banks in the U.S.

4.9
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Chapter V
Implications of the GLBA on Foreign Insurance Companies
5.1

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA) on the insurance industries of developed countries. We find that the
insurance industries of most of the developed countries in our sample have significant
negative spillover effects from the GLBA. Further, we find that this regulation has had a
different impact on the insurance industries of any two countries in our sample. We find
evidence that suggests that a reduction in the diversification opportunities due to the
passage of the GLBA can explain the wealth effect of the individual firms in cross
section analysis. However, we don’t find any evidence that the impact of the GLBA is
statistically different for firms that are from a EU member country versus those that are
not.

5.2

Introduction

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 is the most sweeping deregulation
of the U.S. financial services industry in the last century. Current research finds that the
GLBA has positively affected shareholder value in the U.S. insurance industry. In an era
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of globalization of financial markets and institutions, one would expect the impact of
such extensive deregulation as the GLBA would not be contained by the boundaries of a
nation. This paper focuses on the insurance industries of developed countries to
investigate the international impact of the GLBA.
Figure 1: Market Share of foreign controlled companies and branches and agencies of
foreign companies in the U.S. insurance market (Gross Premium Basis)
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This study focuses on three important questions; first, does the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA) create opportunities or hinder the growth of foreign insurance firms
in the U.S. Current research finds that the GLBA does not have a uniform effect on the
financial services industry. However, these studies consistently find that the GLBA has
positively affected shareholder value in the insurance industry. So it is interesting to
consider whether this act likewise creates opportunity for non-U.S. insurers. Foreign
insurers share of the U.S. is rapidly growing. In 1990, only 9.8% of the market share
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(gross premium) in life insurance and 7.1% the market share (gross premium) in non-life
insurance in the United States was written by foreign controlled companies,1 or branches
and agencies of a foreign insurers. However, by 1998 the market share controlled by
foreign insurers increased to 17.23% of life insurance and 8.67% of non-life insurance.
Figure 1 shows the trend in foreign insurers market share in the U.S. market since 1990.
Historically, increases in the activity of foreign financial firms in the U.S. have created
political pressure on regulators to restrict their growth. For example, Goldberg and
Saunders (1981) note that rapid growth in foreign banks in the U.S. in the early 70s led to
restrictions in multi-state operations of all foreign banks, and subsequently led to the
International Banking Act of 1978.
Secondly, we investigate if the impact on foreign insurance firms varies across
countries and firm-specific attributes. Vaughan and Vaughan (1999), and Moshirian
(1997) predict that U.S. insurance companies will face competition for European insurers
in the domestic market. Table 1, presents a list of the top 25 insurers in 1998 on the basis
of the revenue earned in 1998. Interestingly, of the top 25 firms, 11 companies are from
EU countries and 6 are from Japan, while the U.S. controls more market share than the
combined market share of all EU member countries2. We investigate whether the impact
on EU insurers are different from non-EU insurers. We also explore whether firm specific
variables that can explain the abnormal returns of the domestic insurers from the GLBA
can also explain the returns of the foreign insurance companies.

1

Companies in the United States whose equity is at least 10% owned by non-U.S. persons (before 1990).
Thereafter, foreign (non-U.S.) persons that own equity directly, or indirectly through a holding company
system, 10% or more of the company.
2
15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK.
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Finally, we investigate if the GLBA creates diversification opportunities for
foreign insurers and thereby reduces exposure to systematic risk. Because Cummins and
Weiss (2000) suggest that international diversification may improve the risk-expected
return tradeoff and profit efficiency for the insurance industry.
Table 1: World’s Largest Insurance Companies by Revenues, 1998
Rank

Name

Country of Domicile

1998 Revenues
($ millions)
1.
AXA
France
78,729
2.
Nippon Life
Japan
66,300
3.
Allianz
Germany
64,875
4.
ING Group
Netherlands
56,469
5.
Assicurazioni Generali
Italy
48,478
6.
State Farm
USA
44,621
7.
Dai-ichi Mutual Life
Japan
44,486
8.
Sumitomo Life
Japan
39,535
9.
Zurich Financial
Switzerland
39,115
10.
CGNU
UK
37,589
11.
TIAA-CREF
USA
35,889
12.
Munich Re Group
Germany
35,465
13.
Prudential of America
USA
34,427
14.
Prudential (UK)
UK
33,677
15.
American Int’l Group
USA
33,296
16.
Meiji Mutual Group
Japan
28,476
17.
Metropolitan Life
USA
26,735
18.
Allstate
USA
25,879
19.
Royal and Sun Alliance
UK
25,436
20.
CNP Assurances
France
24,108
21.
Mitsui Mutual Life
Japan
22,226
22.
Loews
USA
20,713
23.
New York Life
USA
19,849
24.
Asahi Mutual Life
Japan
19,418
25.
Aegon
Netherlands
18,727
Source: Jeremy Kahn, “The Fortune Global 500,” Fortune, August 2, 1999.

In this study we analyze 83 foreign insurance companies from 11 countries, our
sample includes 8 EU member countries (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Spain and the UK) and 3 are non-EU countries (Canada, Japan and Switzerland).
We also have included 31 U.S. insurance firms in this study for the purpose of
comparison. We find that most of the foreign insurance industries are significantly and
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negatively affected by the events leading to the passage of the GLBA. Those negatively
affected are Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, and the UK. The
insurance industries of Switzerland is largely unaffected by the regulation. However,
Spain and Austria has positive impact from the passage of the regulation. We don’t find
any evidence that the impact of the GLBA is statistically different for firms that are from
a EU member country versus those that are not.
Most importantly, we find that the GLBA has reduced the capability of foreign
insurers to diversify their portfolio risk by restricting their entry and expansion in the
U.S. market.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: the second section provides a
literature review. Section three briefly discusses the GLBA. Section four introduces the
major hypotheses. Section five describes the methodology, data and lists the major
events. Section six presents the empirical results and a final section concludes.

5.3
5.3.1

Literature:

Literature on the impact of GLBA on domestic Financial Institutions
Current research finds that the GLBA has not had a uniform affect on the

financial services industry. Studies consistently find that the GLBA positively affects
shareholder value in the insurance industry; however, depending on the sample size and
number of events investigated the results for other financial services are mixed. Carow
and Heron (2002) find that only the insurance industry gains from this law. Akhigbe and
Whyte (2001) find that all the sectors of the financial services industry benefit from this
law, while Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) conclude that this law doesn’t impact
the banking industry.
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5.3.2

Literature on international spillover effects
There is evidence in the literature that the impact of GLBA will not be limited to

the U.S. financial services industry. Bruner and Simms (1987) examine the reaction of
U.S. banks to Mexico’s loan crisis and find that U.S. banks reacted negatively to the
news. Musumerci and Sinkey (1990) find that Brazil’s announcement of a debt
moratorium in 1987 had a negative impact on U.S. money center banks. Madura, Whyte
and McDaniel (1991) find that Citicorp’s announcement of substantial increase in loanloss reserves in 1987 had a significantly negative impact on British banks. In all of the
above cases the exposure of banks to less developed countries are identified as the reason
for the negative reactions. Cummins and Weiss (2000) find that international
diversification can improve both the risk-expected return tradeoff and profit efficiency
for the insurance industry.
Carow and Heron (2002) document the only direct evidence of any spillover
effects from the GLBA. This study primarily focuses on the implications of GLBA on
domestic financial institutions, but includes a sub-sample of 10 foreign banks that are
publicly traded in the U.S.. These banks experienced a negative wealth effect from the
passage of the GLBA. Carow and Heron argue that the less favorable reaction of foreign
banks (compared to that of U.S. banks) is due to the requirement imposed by the GLBA
that the entire foreign banking organization has to be well capitalized. Although the
sample size in this study is very small, it provides us with evidence of spillover effects of
the GLBA on foreign banks. In addition, Berger et al. (2000) predict that cross-border
mergers and acquisitions may be motivated by the GLBA.
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5.3.3

Literature on FDI in Insurance & Banking Industry
There are several studies that investigate foreign direct investment (FDI) in the

U.S. insurance industry. Moshirian (1997) finds that demand for insurance services in the
U.S., along with the relative rate of return, labor cost, exchange rate, size of the source
countries’ insurance sector, bilateral relations and trade between the U.S. and the host
countries are the major determinants of FDI in the insurance industry in the U.S. Grosse
and Goldberg (1991) investigate foreign banking activity in the United States by country
of origin. Their results show that foreign investment (FDI and foreign portfolio
investment) in the United States, bilateral trade, and the size of each countries’ banking
sector (demand deposits and time deposits) are positively correlated with each countries
bank presence in the U.S. Seth et al. (1998) show that one of the major determinants of
financial institutions’ growth abroad has been the parallel growth of foreign direct
investment and foreign trade by globally oriented multinational corporations from the
institution’s home country.

5.4

GLBA and the Insurance Industry

Under the new law (GLBA), insurance remains a state-regulated business (the
McCarran-Ferguson Act remains in place). The GLBA repeals sections of the Banking
Act of 1933, including sections 20 and 32, which prohibits national banks from
maintaining securities firms and bank officials from sitting on corporate boards of
insurance companies. It also amends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and creates
a new entity known as a Financial Holding Company (FHC). The FHC is the centerpiece
of this financial modernization. FHCs may engage in activities that are financial in nature
including banking, securities, insurance (underwriting as well as sales as an agent), and
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merchant banking. To qualify as an FHC each subsidiary has to be well managed and
well capitalized. In addition, the depository subsidiary of the FHCs has to comply with
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating requirement.
The GLBA also creates a new type of subsidiary, known as a ‘financial
subsidiary’, through which banks can conduct many of the same activities as that of a
subsidiary of an FHC3. A significant exception is that insurance underwriting may not be
conducted in a financial subsidiary. However, to own such a financial subsidiary, the
GLBA requires that the bank and each of its depository subsidiaries be well managed and
well capitalized.
The GLBA also repeals Title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Act, which states that
the sale or underwriting of insurance is “not closely related” to banking, which had
effectively preventing bank holding companies from selling and underwriting insurance.
The GLBA also preempts anti-affiliation laws. Any attempt by a state to deny a
depository institution from trying to affiliate an insurer can be nullified since states are
forbidden from discriminating against such entities. Hence, the GLBA allows cross
industry mergers that were not previously allowed under the OCC rulings.
In order to engage in any activity in the U.S., any financial intermediary must be
well capitalized and well managed by the standards set by the Federal Reserve (FED).
The FED will review worldwide operations of the financial intermediary to determine
whether or not they can engage in business in the U.S.

5.5

Hypothesis

We test the following four major hypotheses.

3

Broome and Markham, 2001.

130
Hypothesis 1: The GLBA will have a significant spillover effect on the insurance
industry of developed countries.
We expect that insurance industries of developed countries are going to have
significant wealth effects due to the passage of the GLBA for two reasons. First, Bruner
and Simms (1987), Musumerci and Sinkey (1990) and Madura, Whyte and McDaniel
(1991) predict that if the financial sector of a country has exposure to any foreign market
then an event in that foreign market can have spillover effects on the financial sector of
that country. In 1998, foreign controlled companies, or branches or agencies of foreign
companies, controlled 17.23% of the U.S. life insurance market and 8.67% of non-life
insurance market in the U.S., and the lion share of these foreign companies are from
developed countries.
Second, the insurance industry depends upon diversification of risk for its
survival4. Traditionally, the United States has been the largest insurance market in the
world. In 1990, the market share of the U.S. insurance industry was 44.39% and in 1998
it was 45.14% (on gross premium basis) of all OECD countries combined5. The size
domination of the U.S. market exists both in life and non-life insurance. For example, in
1998 the U.S. insurance industry had 34.20% of the market share in life insurance and
57.23% of the market share in non-life insurance of OECD countries6. The size of the
market share makes the U.S. insurance market a natural target for the foreign insurers to
diversify their portfolio risk and also to expand their business in the U.S. insurance

4

Pfeffer (1976) argues that no country has sufficient private insurance capacity to absorb all the insurable
risk in its territory.
5
OECD publications.
6
OECD publications.
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market. Due to the size of the U.S. market, any major regulatory change like the GLBA
should have an impacts on other insurance industries of other countries.
Hypothesis 2: The impact of the GLBA on the insurance industries of any two
countries will not be the same.
Studies find that country specific characteristics such as exchange rate, size of the
source countries insurance sector, and trade with the source country may explain FDI in
the U.S. Thus we argue that since such characteristics, or the exposure to U.S. insurance
market, are not same for any two countries, the impact of the GLBA on any two
countries’ insurance industries will not be the same.
Hypothesis 3: The insurance industries of foreign countries will have a negative
impact from the passage from the GLBA.
The GLBA increased competition in the U.S. insurance industry. Under this
regulation, an FHC is allowed to underwrite insurance and also work as agents. So newly
created FHC will increase competition. One possible way holding companies may enter
the insurance business is through acquisitions. Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002)
and Mamun et al. (2003) predict that banks will acquire insurance firms and enter the
insurance business. In addition, competition in the U.S. insurance industry may increase
because banks can now enter the insurance business (working as agents) using a newly
created financial subsidiary. These new domestic participants in the insurance business
will have a “home field advantage”7 over foreign firms; and thus, we expect that foreign
insurance companies may have negative wealth effects from the passage of GLBA.
Furthermore, capital adequacy and management requirements by the FED under
the GLBA can also be a potential reason for negative wealth effects for foreign insurance
7

See Berger et al. (2000) for details discussion of the Home Field Advantage hypothesis.
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firms. Carow and Heron (2002) argue that many countries impose lower capital
requirements than the U.S. These eligibility requirements impose new costs for foreign
banks that want to do business in the United States, whether as a FHC or under any other
structure.
Hypothesis 4: The GLBA will reduce the diversification opportunities of foreign
insurance firms, and thereby increase risk for their stockholders.
The GLBA will restrict the entry and expansion of foreign insurers in the U.S.
insurance industry due to increased competition from domestic participants in the U.S.
insurance industry who have “home field advantage” and also to tough capital adequacy
and management requirements. This will reduce the diversification opportunities for
foreign insurers in the largest insurance market in the world. This reduction in
diversification benefits will increase risk for stockholders of foreign insurance firms in
developed countries.

5.6
5.6.1

Data & Methodology

Data and Events
We test the above hypotheses using daily common stock returns over a period

from January 1998 to December 2000. Daily stock return and balance sheet information
for major insurance companies from Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK are obtained from the Datastream database.
The daily stock returns for 31 major U.S. insurance firms are obtained from the CRSP
database. The distribution of these firms across countries, along with some firm specific
information and information regarding bilateral trade with the U.S., is presented in Table
2.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of foreign insurance firms.
Total Asset in
Export from
No. of
ROE in 1999⊕ U.S. 99*ℵ
Country
firms
1999* ⊕
Austria
4
$7,361.03
5.85
$2,588.20
Canada
8
$13,581.62
5.53 $166,600.00
France
5 $121,844.71
19.00 $18,877.40
Germany
10
$83,787.01
14.88 $26,800.20
Greece
2
$788.53
12.85
$995.50
Ireland
2
$21,395.57
7.82 $10,090.60
Italy
7
$35,842.49
16.84 $19,436.60
Netherlands
2 $356,892.93
13.18 $57,465.70
Spain
3
$3,998.56
19.14
$6,133.40
Switzerland
7
$48,517.03
9.82
$8,371.30
UK
23
$60,554.09
20.33 $38,407.10
USA
31
$91,216.92
*In millions of U.S. dollars
⊕
Source: Data stream
ℵ
Source Board of Governors Federal Reserve System.

Import to
U.S. 99*ℵ
$2,909.30
$198,711.10
$25,708.60
$55,228.40
$563.10
$22,356.50
$8,475.00
$130,863.90
$5,059.20
$9,538.60
$39,237.20

We identify 13 major events from the Wall Street Journal and Lexis-Nexis wire
service. In Table 3, we summarize the important events.
5.6.2

Portfolio Analysis:
We first adapt the model used by Blinder (1985), and then following Wagster

(1996), we introduce long-term and short-term interest rates to control for interest rate
risk. We also include returns on the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar because returns on
foreign investment will depend on returns on the assets within each market and changes
in the exchange rate. We then modify the model following Cornett and Tehranian (1990)
and introduce the lagged value of the market index for possible nonsynchronous trading
effects. We use dummy variables to identify the major events that led to the passage of
the GLBA. The dummy variable is equal to 1 over every event window and zero
otherwise. The coefficient estimate associated with the dummy variable measures the
impact of the event on the portfolio. The model we estimate is:
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Table 3: Time line of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
Note: The first column ‘Date’ is the event date. If the event occurred after the trading closed for a day then
that the next trading day is the event date. Event Window is defined as Event Date, -1 day and +1 day. The
second column 'Event' describes the main event.
Date
Event
1. (i) Senator Alfonse D’Amato loses his re-election bid (11/03/98 –night). (ii) Senator
11/4/98
Gramm to take over as a chair of Senate Banking Committee. (11/04/98).
1/8/99

2. Financial Services Reform Bill is reintroduced in Congress.

2/17/99

3. Draft bill is unveiled in the Senate.

4/12/99

4. Senator Gramm meets with Senate Minority leader to work on the bill.

4/28/99

5. Senate Banking Committee formally files the Financial Services Modernization Act in the
Senate.

5/4/99

6. Clinton raises the privacy issue to be included in the bill.

05/06/99 –
Midnight

7. Senate passes S. 900. Senate version of the Bill is passed.

7/1/99

8. House version of the bill passes.

10/15/99

9. Federal Reserve and Treasury announce agreement on the regulation.

10/22/99

10. Gramm makes deal with White House on CRA.

11/02/99

11. Joint House Conference report signed by the majority of the conferees, clearing the way
for the votes in both the House and the Senate.

11/4/99

12. Senate passes the bill (90-8) and House passes the bill (362-57).

11/12/99

13. President Clinton signs the bill into law.

2

2

j =1

j =1

2

2

j =1

j =1

Rit = α i + α i ' D + ∑ β mij Rmi ,t + j − 2 + ∑ β mij ' DRmi ,t + j − 2 + ∑ β wij Rwt + j − 2 + ∑ β wij ' DRwt + j − 2
K

(1)

+δ li Rrli ,t + δ si Rrsi ,t + κ i Rf i ,t + ∑ γ ik Dkt + eit
k =1

where, Rit is the return on portfolio i (i= 12, each country has one equally
weighted portfolio) at day t, Rmi,t is the return on market index of country i at day t, Rwt
is the return on MSCI world equity index at day t, , Dkt is the dummy variable which is
equal to one on event window k and zero otherwise, so γik captures the average impact of
kth announcement on ith country. Rfi,t represents the return on the exchange rate between
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the U.S. dollar and the currency of the ith country at day t; Rrsi,t represents the return on
the short term interest rate for country i at day t; Rrli,t represents the return on the long
term interest rate for country i at day t. D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after the
enactment of the regulation and zero otherwise. Thus βm’i1-βm’i2 captures the change in
exposure to systematic risk between pre-act and post-act for country i with respect to its
own country equity index, and βw’i1-βw’i2 captures the change in exposure to systematic
risk between pre-act and post-act for country i with respect to its MSCI world equity
index.
We estimate the model presented in equation 1 using seemingly unrelated
regression. Schwert (1981) argues that individual asset returns of the firms in the same
industry measured over a common time-period are contemporaneously correlated since
firms will react similarly to any unanticipated event. So in events such as regulatory
changes the residuals will not be iid. If there is a contemporaneous correlation among the
disturbances across equations but not correlated over time, SUR model estimates will be
more efficient than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We use a likelihood ratio (LR) test to
test the null hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix
is zero. We perform this test to check for contemporaneous correlation among the
disturbances across equations.
The main advantage of using SUR is that it allows us to test interesting crosscountry restrictions. In order to test for hypothesis 2 we test the following null hypothesis
(here aγi is average abnormal return from 13 events):
H 0 : aγ 1 = aγ 2 = aγ 3 = ..... = aγ 12

(2)
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5.6.3

Cross Sectional Analysis
In order to test for our fourth hypothesis, we generate average abnormal returns

from all 13 events for each firm using the model presented in equation 1. We then
estimate the following model using OLS, where γi is the dependent variable. The crosssectional model is:

γ i , j = θ aus aus + θ cancan + θ fra fra + θ ger ger + θ gre gre + θ ire ire + θ ita ita
+θ spa spa + θ swi swi + θ uk uk + θ m β mi′, j + θ w β wi′ + θ size Sizei + θ ROE ROEi + ε i

(3)

where, aus, can, fra,…… uk are country dummies, equal to one if a firm is from
that country and zero otherwise. As mentioned in hypothesis 2 these dummies shall
control for country specific variations. βm’i,j and βw’i are changes in exposure to
systematic risk with respect to a home country market index and MSCI world equity
index. Sizei is defined as the log of total asset value (in U.S. dollar) in 1998 for firm i and
ROEi is the return on equity of firm i in 1998.

5.7
5.7.1

Empirical Results

Portfolio Analysis
The result of the specification test for our portfolio model shows that the null

hypothesis that the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix is zero is
rejected at the 1% level. Statistically that means that estimating the model with SUR is
asymptotically more efficient as opposed to OLS.
Estimates of model parameters of the portfolio model are presented in Table 4.
We find that for most of the countries the own country equity index is significant and
positive while we find that MSCI world equity index is positive and significant for the
U.S. only.
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Table 4: Estimation results of model parameters of the portfolio model (equation 1).
Parameters
Intercept
Change in the
intercept

Austria
0.000
-0.001

Canada
0.000

France
0.001

Germany
0.000

0.001

0.000

0.001

Greece
0.003 ***
-0.003 **

Ireland
0.000

Italy
0.000

Japan
-0.001 **

Spain
-0.001

Switzerland
UK
0.000
0.000

0.000

0.001 *

0.001 *

0.002 *

0.000

0.001

0.014 *
-1.968 **

Own Country
Equity index (1
day lag)

0.136 ***

0.027

0.069

0.081 **

0.003

0.030

0.057 *

0.033

0.111 ***

0.031

0.047

Own Country
Equity index

0.575 ***

0.587 ***

0.579 ***

0.567 ***

0.712 ***

0.451 ***

0.927 ***

0.768 ***

0.763 ***

0.956 ***

0.394 ***

Change in the
Own Country
Equity index (1
day lag)

-0.100

-0.062

-0.138 *

Change in the
Own Country
Equity index

-0.179 *

-0.238 **

-0.219 *** -0.227 ***

MSCI World
Equity index (1
day lag)

-0.052

0.016

0.144 **

MSCI World
Equity index

0.054

0.061

Change in the
MSCI World
Equity index (1
day lag)

0.044

Change in the
MSCI World
Equity index
Exchange rate
with U.S.
Long-term
Interest rate
Short-term
Interest rate

-0.053

0.018

-0.015

0.312 *** -0.117 *

0.083

-0.003

-0.040

0.092

-0.033

-0.117

0.151

0.101

-0.120

-0.010

-0.120

-0.158

0.008

0.098

-0.009

-0.003

-0.169 *** -0.145 **

-0.027

0.029

-0.074

-0.449 *** -0.542 *** -0.588 *** -0.386 *** -0.066

4.706 ***

0.016
-5.392 ***

0.063

-0.015

0.164 **

0.064

0.052

0.119 **

-0.005

0.018

0.007

-0.051

0.026

0.130

0.036

-0.126

-0.173

-0.120 *

-0.010

-2.569 **

-0.005

0.198

-0.092

-0.099

0.071

0.053

0.020

-0.065

2.509 *

-0.118 *

0.018

0.018

0.050

-0.022

0.028

-0.049

-0.045

-0.056

2.365 **

0.009

0.029

0.033

0.010

0.012

-0.001

-0.016

0.014

0.019

-1.273 **

-0.026

0.026

0.000

0.024

0.001

0.013

-0.006
-0.025
0.029
0.011
-0.040
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

0.119 ***

USA
-0.005

0.595
7.572 ***

0.517
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Table 4: Estimation results of model parameters of the portfolio model (equation 1) continued.
Events
Event1
Event2
Event3
Event4
Event5
Event6
Event7
Event8
Event9
Event10
Event11
Event12
Event13

Austria
Canada
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
-0.006
-0.012 *
0.005
-0.002 -0.002
-0.001
0.004
0.007
-0.018 ***
-0.002 -0.006
0.010
0.030 *** -0.003
-0.002
0.000
0.006
0.004
-0.001
-0.011
-0.009
-0.004 -0.020 *
0.003
-0.002
0.009
0.008
0.003
0.000
0.007
-0.001
-0.005
0.004
0.001 -0.005
-0.001
0.002
-0.007
-0.002
-0.008
0.000
0.001
-0.004
-0.006
0.008
-0.003 -0.001
0.004
-0.001
-0.002
-0.006
0.002 -0.036 ***
0.010
-0.002
-0.007
0.007
-0.008 * 0.013
-0.012 *
-0.003
-0.020 ** -0.004
0.004 -0.005
0.010
-0.004
-0.024 *** -0.004
0.000 -0.005
-0.003
0.000
0.005
-0.007
-0.003 -0.010
-0.003
0.254
0.212
0.385
0.465
0.508
0.235
R2
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Italy
0.001
-0.011 **
-0.019 ***
0.003
0.006
0.000
-0.002
0.003
0.000
-0.004
-0.002
-0.001
-0.004
0.656

Japan
0.006
0.000
-0.007
0.006
0.002
0.001
0.015 **
-0.001
0.041 ***
-0.009
0.003
-0.006
-0.024 ***
0.414

Spain Switzerland
UK
USA
-0.010
0.003
-0.004
0.002
0.014 **
-0.006
0.000
-0.062
0.004
-0.004
-0.001
0.110
-0.003
0.002
0.000
0.018
0.001
0.004
-0.001
0.084
-0.013
-0.001
0.001
0.089
-0.001
-0.002
0.001
0.029
0.002
-0.002
-0.003
-0.042
-0.006
0.006
0.001
0.070
-0.004
-0.002
-0.007 *
0.179 ***
-0.005
-0.004
-0.008 *
0.010
-0.006
0.003
0.002
0.139 **
0.000
-0.001
-0.009 ** -0.031
0.431
0.705
0.287
0.496
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We find that for Canada events 1, 11 and 12 create significantly negative average
abnormal return, for France event 2 create significantly negative average abnormal
return, for Germany event 10 create significantly negative average abnormal return, for
Greece events 4 and 9 create significantly negative average abnormal return, for Ireland
event 10 create significantly negative average abnormal return, for Italy events 2 and 3
create significantly negative average abnormal return, for Japan event 13 create
significantly negative average abnormal return, while events 7 and 9 create significantly
positive average abnormal return, for the UK events 10, 11 and 13 create significantly
negative average abnormal return. However for Austria and Spain one event each create
significantly positive abnormal return. Switzerland seems to remain unaffected from the
events leading to the passage of the GLBA.
Our second hypothesis, that the information produced over these 13 events has the
same impact on the insurance industry of any two countries, is rejected at 1%. This
hypothesis is tested using a Wald test (presented in equation 2).
5.7.2

Cross Section Analysis
In order to identify the sources of the variation in returns around the events that

led to the GLBA, we perform a cross sectional analysis. We estimate equation 3 using the
OLS. The results of the estimation are presented in Panel A of Table 5; the t-statistics are
computed using the formulas suggested by MacKinnon and White (1985). We use
country dummy variables to control for the country specific effects.
We find that βm’i,j is not significant. This result is expected because there is no
major regulatory change in these countries that should impact the diversification
opportunity of these insurance firms. βw’i,j on the other hand is positive and significant.
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This means that the diversification opportunities of these firms with respect to a world
index has been reduced. This complies with our major hypothesis that the GLBA reduced
the diversification opportunities of foreign insurance companies in the largest insurance
market in the world.
Coefficient estimates for Size and ROE are not significantly different from zero,
as expected. However, we use them for the purpose of comparison with the literature
because Hendershott, Lee, and Tompkins (2002) find that size is significant and positive,
and Mamun et al. (2003) find both size and ROE to be significant explanatory variables
in analyses of the impact of the GLBA on domestic insurance firms.
We use the bootstrap method to test for the precision of our estimators due to the
small number of observations. One may argue that asymptotic theory may provide a poor
guide to the significance of the estimator. We can express equation 3 as follows:
yi = X iθ + ε i
We then use the following procedure:
1. We sample with replacement from the original (y, X) sample in pairs.
2. Then we estimate θ j and pseudo t-statistics for the each θ j, we also compute
95% confidence internal for θ j and pseudo t-statistics for the each θ j.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for 1000 times.
4. Then compare the estimates and statistical significance with the normal OLS
regression.
The bootstrap results are presented in Table V panel B. Using the bootstrap tstatistics, none of the country dummy variables are significantly different from zero, and
coefficient estimates for βm’i,j , Size and ROE are also not significantly different from
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zero. Bootstrap results for βw’i,j show that that coefficient estimate is positive significant
(Figure 2 provides that distribution of θw).
Table 5: Cross-sectional analysis of wealth effect on each firm in the insurance industries
of selected developed countries.
We estimate the following model:
γ i , j = θ aus aus + θ cancan + θ fra fra + θ ger ger + θ gre gre + θ ire ire + θ ita ita
+θ spa spa + θ swi swi + θ uk uk + θ m β mi′, j + θ w β wi′ + θ size Sizei + θ ROE ROEi + ε i
We estimate the model using OLS for 71 firms in the sample. Here γi,j is the abnormal
return of firm i of country j. aus, can,….,uk are dummy variables for a particular country,
these variables are equal to one for that country and zero otherwise. βm’i,j is the change in
exposure to systematic risk with respect to home country market index. While βw’i,j is the
change in exposure to systematic risk with respect to home country market index. Size is
log of book value of total assets and ROE is return on equity. Bootstrap p-values are based
on 1000 replications.
Estimation Method: OLS
Estimation Method: Bootstrap
Coefficient Estimates
t-statistic
Variables

θaus
θcan
θfra
θger
θger
θire
θita
θspa
θswi
θuk
θm
θw
θsize
θROE

Coefficient
2.5th
97.5th
E( θˆ )
Estimates t-statistic
percentile percentile
-246.29
-0.25
-18.40 -1657.79 2708.13
-588.80
-0.58 -349.71 -2010.80 2340.02
-60.25
-0.06
162.15 -1415.80 3163.75
-196.80
-0.19
7.97 -1722.58 2967.50
-273.12
-0.30 -119.17 -1538.25 2040.68
-69.57
-0.07
132.46 -1298.60 2809.47
-79.37
-0.08
116.53 -1467.11 2906.41
-148.19
-0.16
52.42 -1339.01 2605.55
-201.80
-0.19
36.45 -1599.84 3010.91
-255.18
-0.31
-14.87 -1139.64 2293.52
-8.85
-0.16
-23.69 -161.99
85.76
0.12 ***
5.61
0.12
0.05
0.23
2.65
0.04
-11.15 -185.94
81.01
3.28
1.64
3.26
-0.65
8.82

R2
0.658
F-Statistics
8.425 ***
*** Significant at 1%

2.5th
97.5th
E(t-stat) percentile percentile
-0.40
-4.63
3.75
-1.19
-5.94
3.55
-0.12
-4.24
3.99
-0.40
-4.86
3.93
-0.48
-4.20
2.98
-0.07
-3.49
3.45
-0.24
-4.73
4.12
-0.25
-4.15
3.64
-0.41
-4.98
3.89
-0.54
-4.87
3.64
-0.45
-3.61
2.75
10.43
3.27
24.69
0.21
-4.39
5.27
0.97
-0.20
2.16
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Figure 2: Distribution from bootstrap of θw

Empirical distribution of θw for 1000 bootstrap samples.
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We also test whether EU firms have a different impact from the GLBA than nonEU firms. We modify equation 3, and then replace all the country dummy variables with
one dummy, which is 1 if it is a EU country and zero otherwise. The modified model is
presented in equation 4 as:

γ i , j = Intercept + θ eu eu + θ m β mi′, j + θ w β wi′ + θ size Sizei + θ ROE ROEi + ε i

(4)

Here we test the hypothesis, H 0 : θ eu = 0 . The result, as presented in Table 6,
shows that the null hypothesis is maintained; i.e. insurance companies from EU member
countries are not affected differently from those in non-EU countries.
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Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of wealth effect on each firm in the insurance industries
EU vs. Non-EU countries.
We estimate the following model:
γ i , j = Intercept + θ eu eu + θ m β mi′, j + θ w β wi′ + θ size Sizei + θ ROE ROEi + ε i
We estimate the model using OLS for 83 firms in the sample. Here γi,j is the abnormal
return of firm i of country j. eu is a dummy variable which is 1 if it is a EU member country
and zero otherwise. βm’i,j is the change in exposure to systematic risk with respect to home
country market index. While βw’i,j is the change in exposure to systematic risk with respect
to home country market index. Size is log of book value of total asset and ROE is return on
equity.
t-statistic
Estimate
228.656
0.271
229.861
1.014
-17.292
-0.301
0.121 ***
6.178
-37.262
-0.690
2.461
1.468

Parameter
Intercept

θeu
θm
θw
θsize
θROE

0.646
R2
F-Statistics
23.382 ***
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

5.8

Conclusion

We examine the impact of the GLBA, a major regulatory change in the U.S.
financial services industry, on a sample of 83 non-U.S. insurance companies from 11
countries. In an era of globalization of financial markets, it is argued in the literature that
deregulations like the GLBA or the single market program of EU should have an impact
beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction8. In this paper we present further evidence of
the globalization of financial institutions. In our portfolio analysis we find that insurance
industries of 8 out of 11 developed countries have significant negative wealth effects
from passage of the GLBA, a deregulation that was designed to impact the financial
services industry of the United States. We also find that the impact of the GLBA is not

8

Berger, DeYoung and Udell (2000).
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the same for any two foreign insurance industries. And the impact of the GLBA is
statistically not different for firms from a EU member country or not.
Fig 3: Acquisition of the US insurance companies by foreign insurers.
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Most importantly, we show that the negative wealth effects are due to the
reduction in the opportunities for risk diversification by foreign insurance firms. This
reduction in diversification opportunities in the largest insurance market results from the
GLBA. Because the GLBA requires that the entire foreign financial institution be well
capitalized, it may be difficult for many foreign firms to meet the new standards. In
addition, the GLBA creates more competition in the insurance market by allowing
domestic commercial banks to participate in this market as insurance agents and FHCs to
operate a full range of insurance businesses. Further, these domestic firms have a home
field advantage over the foreign firms. Anecdotal evidences also support the argument
that the GLBA created barriers to entry in the U.S. insurance industry for foreign
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insurance firms. Figure 3 shows that after 1998, the number of acquisitions by foreign
firms of U.S. insurance firms fell to less than half. Blanden (2000) also reports that the
number of foreign banks in the U.S. has been declining, offering further evidence of
barriers to entry in U.S. financial markets.

5.9
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